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Brown: Brown: Disinheriting the Legal Orphan:

Disinheriting the "Legal Orphan":
Inheritance Rights of Children After
Termination of Parental Rights
RichardL. Brown*

I. INTRODUCTION
The plight of orphans, from Oliver Twist' and Harry Potter 2 of literature
to the far more real AIDS orphans of today,3 has long engaged our social
consciousness and conscience. By "orphans" we have meant children who
have suffered the death of their parents.4 This Article addresses the plight of a

* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada
Las Vegas. B.A., University of California Los Angeles, 1967; J.D., Indiana University, 1975; M.L.L., University of Washington, 1978. I would like to express my appreciation to Ann McGinley and Lynnda Brown for their useful comments on earlier
drafts of this Article.
i. Oliver Twist, of course, was the title character in Charles Dickens's novel of
the same name. Oliver Twist was first published serially in Bentley's Miscellany,
beginning in 1837. Fred Kaplan, Preface to CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST ix, x

(Fred Kaplan ed., Norton Critical ed. 1993). Dickens's novels are replete with orphans and evocative accounts of their condition-Little Nell in The Old Curiosity
Shop, David Copperfield in David Copperfield, Pip in Great Expectations, Esther
Summerson in Bleak House. See Generally BARUCH HOCHMAN & IUA WACHS,
DICKENS: THE ORPHAN CONDITION (1999). Dickens was hardly alone among Victorian novelists in focusing on the plight of orphans, among them Heathcliff in Emily
Bronte's Wuthering Heights, Jane Eyre in Charlotte Bronte's novel of the same name,
and Eppie in George Eliot's Silas Marner. For a discussion of the role of the orphan
in Victorian literature and society, see LAURA PETERS, ORPHAN TEXTS: VICTORIAN
ORPHANS, CULTURE AND EMPIRE (2000).
2. As every late twentieth and early twenty-first century parent knows, Harry
Potter, orphaned when his parents are killed by an evil wizard, is the protagonist in a
series of wildly successful children's novels by the Scottish author J. K. Rowling. The

series began with the publication of Harry Potter and the Philosopher'sStone (published in the United States under the title Harry Potter and the Sorcerer's Stone) in

1997.
3. See Deborah L. Shelton, AIDS Orphans: The Forgotten Victims, HUM. RTS.,

Fall 1995, at 18.
4. "Orphan" is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as "[o]ne deprived by
death of father or mother, or (more generally) of both parents; a fatherless or motherless child." 10 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 944 (2nd ed. 1989). Interestingly, the
secondary definition provided for the term orphan in the OED, "[o]ne bereft of protection, advantages, benefits, or happiness, previously enjoyed," id., captures many
aspects of the plight of the legal orphan with which this Article is concerned.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
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different kind of orphan-the "legal orphan ' 5 who has lost her parents
through a termination of parental rights proceeding but who has not been
subsequently adopted by new parents. Every state has established a statutory
procedure to terminate the parental rights of unfit parents. Recent federal
legislation aimed at reducing the number of children mired in the foster care
system is accelerating the rate at which parental rights are being terminated.
Adoption of these children, however, is not keeping pace with the rate at
which parental rights are being terminated. As a result, the number of legal
orphans is growing.
This Article addresses the inheritance rights of these legal orphans. In
some states, termination of parental rights (TPR) statutes expressly provide
that the right of the child to inherit from the biological parent survives termination. In other states, termination statutes explicitly extinguish the inheritance rights of the child. In many states, however, termination statutes do not
explicitly address inheritance rights at all, although these statutes often use
broad language divesting both parent and child of all legal rights, obligations,
and duties with respect to each other, suggesting that the right of the child to
inherit from the terminated parent is extinguished. In a significant number of
states, then, termination of parental rights will, or might, result in the loss of
the child's right to inherit from his biological parents. Part II of the Article
outlines the nature of state termination of parental rights statutes, notes the
effect of recent federal legislation on those proceedings, and describes the
effect of various types of termination of parental rights statutes on the inheritance rights of the child.
Part III(A) argues that barring a child's right to inherit from terminated
parents contravenes the policies that underlie the child welfare system. The
primary goal of the child welfare system in general, and the termination of
parental rights process in particular, is to further the welfare of the child. Depriving children of the right to inherit from their parents, and from their parents' families, does not benefit children, but rather imposes an additional
burden on children who are already disadvantaged not only by the inadequacies of their parents, but likely by poverty and minority status as well.
Part III(B) argues that the disinheritance of children of terminated parents is also inconsistent with the broader scheme of intestate succession. In
the American legal system, inheritance rights are almost invariably based on
the parent-child relationship--children inherit from their biological mothers
and fathers. There are two notable exceptions to this general rule-adopted
children and non-marital children-and the Article compares children of terminated parents with these other two categories of children who can lose the
right to inherit from their biological parents. Neither of these exceptions sug5. The term "legal orphan," in the sense in which it is used in this Article,
seems to have been originated by Professor Martin Guggenheim. See Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of ParentalRights
of Children in Foster Care-An Empirical Analysis in Two States, 29 FAM. L.Q. 121

(1995).
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gests a rationale for extinguishing the right of children to inherit from their
terminated biological parents.
Part IV considers the constitutionality of termination of parental rights
statutes that disinherit children. The series of United States Supreme Court
decisions that invalidated on equal protection grounds statutes that discriminated against non-marital children will be reviewed. These Supreme Court
cases, and particularly those dealing directly with inheritance rights of nonmarital children, suggest that similar bars on inheritance by children of terminated parents may be similarly subject to challenge on equal protection
grounds. Finally, Part V will suggest how termination of parental rights statutes should be rewritten to explicitly protect the right of children to inherit
from their terminated parents.
II. THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS SCHEME
The right of parents to raise their children is fundamental. 6 However, the
state also has a substantial interest in the welfare of children, reflected in the
state's parens patriaepower-the power of the state to protect those, such as
children, who are unable to protect themselves. 7 That power can extend, in
extreme cases, to the most draconian intervention-the termination of all of a
parent's rights in the child.
Every state provides by statute a mechanism for the involuntary termination of parental rights.8 These statutes vary considerably, but they generally
include several common components. 9 Termination of parental rights statutes
6. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) ("The fundamental liberty
interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not
evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary
custody of their child to the State."); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 535 (1925) ("The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its
children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is
not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have
the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations.").
7. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1137 (7th ed. 1999). For a history of the parens
patriaedoctrine, see Judith Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887
(1975).

8. 1 JOAN HEIFETZ
4.04(1)(a) (2004).

HOLLINGER ET AL., ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE

§

9. Madelyn Freundlich, Expediting Termination of ParentalRights: Solving a
Problem or Sowing the Seeds of a New Predicament?,28 CAP. U. L. REv. 97, 104

(1999).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2005

3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 8
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 70

generally require a showing that the parent is unfit.' 0 Parental unfitness must
be established by clear and convincing evidence." TPR statutes generally
enumerate categories of unfitness, often including abuse, neglect, abandonment, nonsupport, mental illness, drug abuse, alcohol abuse, and long term
imprisonment.' 2 TPR statutes also frequently require that services aimed at
alleviating the problem be offered to the parent and that the problem continue
also generally
despite the offering of those services. 13 Finally, TPR statutes
4
require that termination be in the best interest of the child.1
A. The Impact of FederalLegislation
Although termination of parental rights is a creature of state statutes, the
state statutory schemes have been substantially affected by federal legislation.
In the 1970s, scholars and lawmakers became concerned with "foster care
drift," which refers to the phenomenon of children spending many years in
foster care, often under the care of a series of foster parents. 15 In response,
Congress enacted the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980
("AACWA").' 6 AACWA began a movement "toward nationalizing the rules
by which children enter state-supervised foster care, the obligations states
owe to families with children in foster care, and the expected conditions and
timelines under which children are to remain in foster care."' 7 AACWA imposed several requirements on states receiving federal funding.'" AACWA
required that every child's case be reviewed every six months and that a judicial hearing be held once a child has spent eighteen months in the foster care
system.' 9 The Act also required that states' child welfare agencies make "reasonable efforts" to reunite children with their biological families,20 although
the scope of the required "reasonable efforts" remained undefined. 2'
AACWA, however, did not end concerns about the plight of children in
the child welfare system. The Act was criticized as focusing too much on

10. 1 HOLLINGER

ET AL.,

supra note 8, § 4.04(1)(a); Freundlich, supra note 9, at

104.
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769-70.
1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 8, § 4.04(I)(a)(i)-(vii).
Freundlich, supra note 9, at 104.
Id. at 104-05.
Libby S. Adler, The Meanings of Permanence: A Critical Analysis of the
Adoption and Safe FamiliesAct of 1997,38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1,2(2001).
16. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94
Stat. 500 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
17. Guggenheim, supra note 5, at 122.
18. Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and Failureof
the Adoption and Safe FamiliesAct of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REV. 637, 644 (1999).
19. Guggenheim, supra note 5, at 123.
20. See Gordon, supranote 18, at 644.
21. Adler, supra note 15, at 5.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss1/8
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family reunification, with the result that children remained in foster care for
lengthy periods or were returned to unsafe families. 22 The Adoption and Safe
Families Act of 1997 ("ASFA") was intended to address these concerns.23
ASFA amended AACWA in several significant ways. First, ASFA clarified
the "reasonable effort" required to reunify children with their biological families. 24 Most significantly, ASFA requires that in determining what reasonable
efforts are required, and in making such efforts, the health and safety of the
child shall be the primary goal. 25 ASFA also specifies certain circumstances
in which reasonable efforts are not required prior to termination. 26 Those
special circumstances include judicial determination that the parent has subjected the child to "aggravated circumstances" as defined by state law, which
may include "abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse." 27 Reasonable efforts are also not required if the parent has committed the crimes of
murder or voluntary manslaughter upon another child of the parent, or attempted murder or felony assault resulting in "serious bodily injury [either] to
the child or [to] another child of the parent," 28 or if the parent's parental
rights to a sibling of the child have been involuntarily terminated.29
ASFA also includes provisions intended to reduce "foster care drift" by
expediting the process of determining the appropriate permanent placement
for the child. 30 When reasonable efforts at family reunification are not required,31 a permanency hearing must be held within thirty days 32 and "reasonable efforts shall be made to place the child in a timely manner in accordance with the permanency plan, and to complete whatever steps are necessary to finalize the permanent placement of the child. '33 Efforts to find an
adoptive placement for the child may occur concurrently with the required
reasonable efforts to reunify the family. 34 ASFA requires that a permanency
hearing be held within twelve months after the child enters foster care and at
least every twelve months thereafter as long as the child remains in foster
care. 35 Most significantly, ASFA requires that if a child has been in foster
care for 15 of the most recent 22 months, the state must file a petition to ter-

22. See id. at 3; Freundlich, supra note 9, at 99; Gordon, supra note 18, at 649.
23. Gordon, supra note 18, at 650.
24. Id.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a)(l 5)(A) (2000).
26. Id. § 671(a)(! 5)(D)(i)-(iii).
27. Id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i).
28. Id. § 671(a)(I 5)(D)(ii).
29. Id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(iii).
30. See Gordon, supra note 18, at 650-51.
31. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(E)(i).
33. Id. § 671(a)(15)(E)(ii).
34. Id. § 671(a)(15)(F).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (2000).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
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minate parental rights,3 6 subject to several exceptions.37 ASFA also requires
that, concurrently with the filing of the petition for termination of parental
rights, the state also
"identify, recruit, process, and approve a qualified family
38
for an adoption."
The primary thrust of the ASFA requirements is to de-emphasize the
goal of family reunification and to expedite permanent placement, most often
through termination of parental rights. Whether this shift toward expedited
termination of parental rights is a good idea-and it has been subject to substantial criticism 39-is beyond the scope of this Article. But, whether the effect of ASFA is beneficial or detrimental to children, it is having an impact
that is very relevant to our topic. To the extent that ASFA is successful in
achieving its goals, the pace of termination of parental rights proceedings is
likely to increase. The number of terminations, however, may not be matched
36. Id. § 675(5)(E). The requirement that the state file a petition to terminate
parental rights also arises
if a court of competent jurisdiction has determined a child to be an abandoned infant (as defined under State law) or has made a determination that
the parent has committed murder of another child of the parent, committed
voluntary manslaughter of another child of the parent, aided or abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit such a murder or such a voluntary manslaughter, or committed a felony assault that has resulted in serious bodily injury to the child or to another child of the parent.
Id. But see In the Interest of M.D.R., 124 S.W.3d 469 (Mo. 2004) (finding 15 of 22
months period merely triggers state's obligation to file for termination but is not an
independent grounds for termination itself).
37. The state will not be required to file a petition to terminate parental rights if
(i) at the option of the State, the child is being cared for by a relative; (ii) a
State agency has documented in the case plan ... a compelling reason for

determining that filing such a petition would not be in the best interests of
the child; or (iii) the State has not provided to the family of the child, consistent with the time period in the State case plan, such services as the
State deems necessary for the safe return of the child to the child's home,
if reasonable efforts of the type described in section 671(a)(15)(B)(ii) of
this title are required to be made with respect to the child.
Id. § 675(5)(E)(i)-(iii).
38. Id. § 675(5)(E).
39. See, e.g.,

DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATrERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD

113 (2002) ("ASFA threatens to permanently separate children from families, families that might have been preserved with the right incentives, adequate state
resources, or creative custody arrangements."); Richard Wexler, Take the Child and
Run: Talesfrom the Age ofASFA, 36 NEw ENG. L. REv. 129, 130 (2001) ("ASFA was
the culmination of an assault on safe, effective programs to keep families together that
began in the 1990's. The law has caused untold misery for thousands of children.
While supposedly intended to solve the problems of the foster care system, it has, in
fact, worsened those problems. In the name of promoting adoption, it is creating a
generation of legal orphans. And worst of all, in the name of child safety, it has made
children less safe.") (footnote omitted).
WELFARE
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4°
by the number of subsequent adoptions. That, in turn, may lead to a growing
number of "legal orphans," children caught for long periods in limbo, no
longer the children of their biological parents, but not yet (and perhaps not
ever) the children of adoptive parents.4 ' In the words of Professor Appell,
"every year the state creates hundreds, if not thousands, of legal orphans,
children who have no legal or flesh and blood parents. The number of these
legal orphans will increase with the application of ASFA's mandatory termi42
Professor Appell further notes that
nation of parental rights provisions.
"[a]s of September 1999, states reported that 46,000 children are legal orphans and had been for an average of twenty-three months. On average, at
any given time, 8,000 legal orphans have no current prospects for adoption., 43 It is the inheritance status of these children with which we are concerned and to which we now turn.

B. State Statutory Schemes
What does the text of state termination of parental rights statutes tell us
about the effect the termination order has on the inheritance rights of these
growing numbers of legal orphans-the children of terminated parents? In
fact, different statutes provide quite different answers, and many statutes provide no answer at all.
Among those statutes that explicitly address the effect of the termination
order on inheritance rights, the most common approach (which I will call the
"Type 1" approach ) is to provide that the order does not affect the right of
the child to inherit from the parent. Type I statutes are not uniform, however.
Some explicitly preserve the inheritance rights of the child, while saying
nothing about the inheritance rights of the terminated parent. The Utah stat40. See Freundlich, supra note 9, at 108-09 ("If the ASFA, despite the potential
barriers, achieves its goal of freeing more children for adoption through expediting
termination of parental rights as projected, the increase in the number of children in
foster care needing adoption planning and services will be dramatic. The growth in
adoption demand, already being experienced across the country, raises critical questions about the 'supply' side of adoption for children in foster care-the recruitment
of an adequate number of well-prepared adoptive families and the provision of ongoing support services following placement and adoption finalization to ensure stability
and permanency. While attention has been given to further stimulating demand
through expedited termination of parental rights, there has not been equivalent attention paid to enhancing supply through family recruitment, preparation, and postadoption support.") (footnotes omitted).
41. Id. at 109-10. See also Guggenheim, supra note 5, at 121-22. (Professor
Guggenheim's study was conducted after the adoption of the Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Act of 1980 but before adoption of the Adoption and Safe Families Act
of 1997).
42. Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood,34 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 683, 777-78 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
43. Id. at 777 n.409 (citations omitted).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
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ute, which provides that "[a]n order for the termination of the parent-child
legal relationship divests the child and the parents of all legal rights, powers,
immunities, duties, and obligations with respect to each other, except the right
of the child to inheritfrom the parent,' is typical.
While many Type 1 statutes specifically address the inheritance rights of
the child (by preserving them) but say nothing about the inheritance rights of
the parent, other Type 1 statutes expressly terminate the parent's right to inherit after termination, but also expressly retain the child's right to inherit.
The Virginia statute, which reads in relevant part,
[A]n order terminating residual parental rights ... shall terminate
the rights of the parent to take from or through the child in question
but the order shall not otherwise affect the rights of the child, the
child's kindred, or the parent's kindred to take from or through the
parent or the right of the parent's kindred to take from or through
the child,45
exemplifies this approach.46 Yet another approach within the Type I category
is taken in states with statutes which provide that the termination order di-

44. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-413(l) (2002) (emphasis added). See also CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 45a-707(8) (2004) ("'Termination of parental rights' means the com-

plete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and the child's parent or parents so that the child is free
for adoption except it shall not affect the right of inheritance of the child or the religious affiliation of the child.") (emphasis added); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-61 1(1)

(2003) ("An order for the termination of the parent-child legal relationship divests the
child and the parents of all legal rights, powers, immunities, duties, and obligations

with respect to each other.., except the right of the child to inheritfrom the parent.")
(emphasis added); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-317(a) (Michie 2003) ("An order terminating the parent-child legal relationship divests the parent of all legal rights and
privileges and relieves the child of all duties to that parent except: . . . (ii) The right of

the child to inheritfrom the parent shall not be affected by the order.") (emphasis

added).
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.1(5) (Michie 2002).
46. See also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1583(f) (2001) ("A termination of parental
rights under the Kansas code for care of children shall not terminate the right of the
child to inheritfrom or through the parent. Upon such termination, all the rights of
birth parents to such child, including their right to inheritfrom or through such child,
shall cease.") (emphasis added); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7006-1.3(A) (West 1998)
("The termination of parental rights terminates the parent-child relationship, including
the parent's right to the custody of the child and the parent's right to visit the child,
the parent's right to control the child's training and education, the necessity for the

parent to consent to the adoption of the child, the parent's right to the earnings of the

child, and the parent'sright to inheritfrom or through the child. Provided, that nothing herein shall in any way affect the right of the child to inheritfrom the parent.")
(emphasis added).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss1/8
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vests both parent and child of all legal rights and obligations, except that the
47
rights of both the parent and the child to inherit shall not be terminated.
Some Type 1 statutes make explicit that the right of the child to inherit
48
from the terminated parent continues only until the child is adopted. Even in
47. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4056(1) (West 2004) ("An order terminating parental rights divests the parent and child of all legal rights, powers, privileges,
immunities, duties and obligations to each other as parent and child, except the inheritance rights between the child and his parent.") (emphasis added); N.H. REV. STAT.

ANN. § 170-C:12 (2002) ("An order terminating the parent-child relationship shall
divest the parent and the child of all legal rights, privileges, duties and obligations....

The rights of inheritanceof both the parent and the child shall not be divested until
the adoption of said child.") (emphasis added).
48. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-539 (West 1999) ("An order terminating the

parent-child relationship shall divest the parent and the child of all legal rights, privileges, duties and obligations with respect to each other except the right of the child to

inherit and support from the parent. This right of inheritanceand support shall only
be terminated by a final order of adoption.") (emphasis added); COLO. REV. STAT. §

19-3-608(1) (1999) ("An order for the termination of the parent-child legal relationship divests the child and the parent of all legal rights, powers, privileges, immunities,

duties, and obligations with respect to each other, but it shall not modify the child's
status as an heir at law which shall cease only upon a final decree of adoption.")

(emphasis added); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2361(a) (2001) ("An order terminating the
parent and child relationship divests the parent and the child of all legal rights, powers, privileges, immunities, duties and obligations with respect to each other, except

the right of the child to inheritfrom his or her parent. The right of inheritanceof the
child shall be terminated only by afinal orderof adoption.") (emphasis added); HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-63 (Michie 1999) ("No judgment of termination of parental
rights entered under sections 571-61 to 571-63 shall operate to terminate the mutual
rights of inheritanceof the child and the parent or parents involved.., unless and
until the child has been legally adopted ") (emphasis added); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §

625.104 (Michie 1999) ("Following the entry of an order involuntarily terminating

parental rights in a child, the child shall retain the right to inheritfrom his parent
under the laws of descent and distribution until the child is adopted.") (emphasis

added); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B- 1112 (2003) ("An order terminating the parental rights
completely and permanently terminates all rights and obligations of the parent to the
juvenile and of the juvenile to the parent arising from the parental relationship, except

that the juvenile's right of inheritancefrom the juvenile's parent shall not terminate
until a final order of adoption is issued.") (emphasis added); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-

1576(A) (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 2003) ("An order terminating the relationship
between parent and child under this subarticle divests the parent and the child of all
legal rights, powers, privileges, immunities, duties, and obligations with respect to
each other, except the right of the child to inheritfrom the parent. A right of inheritance is terminated only by a final order of adoption.") (emphasis added); TENN.

CODE ANN. § 36-1-113()(1) (2001 & Supp. 2004) ("An order terminating parental
rights shall have the effect of severing forever all legal rights and obligations of the
parent or guardian of the child against whom the order of termination is entered and

of the child who is the subject of the petition to that parent or guardian ....(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (1)(1), a child who is the subject of the

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
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the absence of such explicit language, the right of children to inherit from
their biological parents is terminated in almost every jurisdiction by adoption.49
Although it is clear under most Type 1 statutes that the child's right to
inherit from the parent survives the termination order, at least until the child
is adopted by new parents, Type 1 statutes leave at least one other issue unaddressed-does the child retain (at least until adoption) the right to inherit
not just from the terminated parent, but through the parent as well? In other
words, if the terminated parent has predeceased the child, can the child inherit
from parents of the terminated parents or from siblings of the terminated parents to the same extent that she would if parental rights had not been terminated? A very few Type 1 statutes explicitly answer that question in the affirmative. 50 While the right of the child to inherit from other relatives through
the terminated parent is not explicitly protected in most Type 1 statutes, it is
hard to conceive of any rationale for not recognizing the continuation of that
right after termination.
In a smaller number of states, termination of parental rights statutes take
a dramatically different approach. These statutes, which I will call Type 2
statutes, divest both parent and child of their inheritance rights upon termination of parental rights .5 Type 2 statutes are unique in expressly divesting the
orderfor termination shall be entitled to inheritfrom a parent whose rights are terminated until the final orderof adoption is entered.") (emphasis added).

49. See Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the NontraditionalFamily, 1996 UTAH L. REv. 93, 150-51.
50. See LA. CHILDREN'S CODE ANN. art. 1038 (West 2004) ("A final judgment
terminating parental rights relieves the child and the parent against whom the judgment is rendered of all of their legal duties and divests them of all of their legal rights
with regard to one another except ... (1) The right of the child to inheritfrom his
biologicalparents and other relatives.") (emphasis added); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A4-29(P) (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2003) ("A judgment of the court terminating parental
rights divests the parent of all legal rights and privileges .... A judgment of the court
terminatingparentalrights shall not affect the child's rights of inheritancefrom and
through the child's biologicalparents.") (emphasis added); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
161.206(b) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004-2005) ("[A]n order terminating the parentchild relationship divests the parent and the child of all legal rights and duties with
respect to each other, except that the child retains the right to inherit from and
through the parent unless the court otherwiseprovides.") (emphasis added).
51. See GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-93 (2001) ("An order terminating the parental
rights of a parent under this article is without limit as to duration and terminates all
the parent's rights and obligations with respect to the child and all rights and obligations of the child to the parent arising from the parental relationship, including rights
of inheritance.") (emphasis added). While it is not entirely clear from the text that the
last clause relating to inheritance applies to both the child and the parent, a Georgia
court has held that the language of an almost identical predecessor statute acts to
terminate the inheritance rights of both parent and child from each other. Spence v.
Levi, 211 S.E.2d 622, 624 (Ga. App. 1974). See IDAHO CODE § 16-2011 (Michie
2001) ("An order terminating the parent and child relationship shall divest the parent
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child's right to inherit from parents whose parental rights have been terminated. One Type 2 statute, enacted in Delaware, explicitly extinguishes not
only the child's right to inherit from the terminated parent, but the child's
right to inherit from the terminated parent's lineal and collateral kin (i.e., the
2
child's grandparents, aunts and uncles, etc.) as well The broad language
referring to extinguishing inheritance rights in the other Type 2 statutes suggests that those statutes would also likely act to extinguish the right of the
child to inherit from parental kin.
Among those TPR statutes that expressly mention inheritance rights,
then, the majority are Type I statutes which explicitly preserve the child's
right to inherit from the terminated parent, at least until adoption. Only Type
2 statutes, of which there are relatively few, explicitly divest the child of inheritance rights. But that does not necessarily mean that the inheritance rights
of the child survive the termination of parental rights in most states. Unlike
Type 1 and Type 2 statutes, many state TPR statutes make no specific reference to inheritance rights at all. I will call these statutes-which neither expressly preserve nor expressly extinguish the child's right to inherit-Type 3
statutes.
The effect of Type 1 and Type 2 statutes on the right of the child to inherit from the terminated parent is clear-Type I statutes explicitly preserve
the child's right to inherit, while Type 2 statutes explicitly extinguish that
right. In contrast, the effect of Type 3 statutes on inheritance rights of children is more difficult to discern, as the language of the statutes varies considerably and judicial interpretations are sparse. Some Type 3 statutes include
broad language divesting both parent and child of all legal rights, obligations,
and duties.53 The language of the Minnesota statutes is typical: "Upon the
and the child of all legal rights, privileges, duties, and obligations, including rights of
inheritance, with respect to each other.") (emphasis added); NEV. REV. STAT.
128.015(1) (2003) (defines "parent and child relationship" within the termination of
parental rights chapter as follows: "'Parent and child relationship' includes all rights,
privileges and obligations existing between parent and child, including rights of inheritance.") (emphasis added).
52. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1113(b) (1999) ("Upon the issuance of an order
terminating the existing parental rights and transferring such parental rights to another
person or organization, the child shall lose all rights of inheritancefrom the parents
whose parental rights were terminated and from their collateral or lineal relatives
and the parents whose parental rights were terminated and their collateral or lineal
relativesshall lose all rights of inheritancefrom the child.") (emphasis added).
53. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-35-6-4(a)(1) (West 1999) ("[A]II rights, powers,
privileges, immunities, duties, and obligation, including any rights to custody, control,
visitation, or support, pertaining to the relationship, are permanently terminated .... );
IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.2(56) (West 2000 & Supp. 2004) ("'Termination of the parent-child relationship' means the divestment by the court of the parent's and child's
privileges, duties and powers with respect to each other."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-2046(1) (1991 & Supp. 2003) ("An order terminating parental rights of a parent terminates all the parent's rights and obligations with respect to the child and of the child to
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termination of parental rights all rights, powers, privileges, immunities, duties, and obligations, including any rights to custody, control, visitation, or
support existing between the child and parent shall be severed and terminated., 54 Other Type 3 statutes, however, are less comprehensive in their
descriptions of the effect of a termination order. The Alaska statute, for example, provides only that "the rights and responsibilities of the parent regarding the child may be terminated for the purposes of freeing a child for adoption or other permanent placement." 5 Yet others are even more constrained
in their apparent scope, explicitly extinguishing only the parent's rights, but
saying nothing about the effect of the termination order on the duties and
56
obligations of the parent and on the rights of the child.
Do Type 3 TPR statutes operate to terminate the inheritance rights of the
child? The case law, while sparse, suggests that these statutes may do exactly
that. The Minnesota Supreme Court faced that question directly, and concluded that the Minnesota statute did extinguish the child's right to inherit
from parents whose parental rights had been terminated. 57 The court noted
that the broad language in the statute severing "all rights, powers, privileges,
immunities, duties and obligations.., existing between child and the parent"
is followed by two explicit exceptions-first, "that a support obligation may
not be terminated under specific circumstances"5 8 and, second, "that a termination of parental rights will not disentitle a child to any benefits the child
may derive because of membership in a federally recognized Indian tribe. ' 9
The court concluded that "[b]y carving out an exception, the legislature exclude[d] other exceptions" and that, thus, there is no exception preserving the
right of the child to inherit. 6° Given the broad language of the statute and the
statutory enumeration of specific, limited exceptions, the court's interpretation of the Minnesota statute is unsurprising.
Other courts, while not addressing the issue directly, have assumed
without discussion that Type 3 termination of parental rights statutes extinguish the child's right to inherit from the terminated parent. The Iowa Court
or through the parent arising from the parental relationship."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15A, § 3-505(a)(1) (2002) ("An order issued under this part granting the petition ...
(I) terminates the relationship of parent and child between the respondent and the
minor...."); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.43(2) (West 2003) ("An order terminating parental rights permanently severs all legal rights and duties between the parent and the
child.").
54. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260C.317 (West 2003).
55. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.088(a) (Michie 2004).
56. See OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.524 (2003) ("[Tlhe order permanently terminates
all rights of the parent or parents whose rights are terminated and the parent or parents
have no standing to appear as such in any legal proceeding concerning the ward.").
57. In re Estate of Braa, 452 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1990).
58. Id. at 688.
59. Id.
60. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss1/8
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of Appeals, for instance, reversed the decision of the juvenile court terminating the parental rights of a father because the termination was not in the best
interests of the child, in part because the termination of parental rights would
eliminate the child's "right to support or any prospective inheritance, windfall, or estate from [the father].",61 No authority is cited for this proposition.
Iowa statutes define the effect of a termination of parental rights quite broadly
to mean "the divestment by the court of the parent's and child's privileges,
duties and powers with respect to each other, 62 although that statutory language was never mentioned by the court. Similarly, the Alaska Supreme
Court, in remanding a termination of parental rights case, expressed doubt
that the termination of a mother's parental rights would be in the child's best
interest, again because "[i]f [the mother's] parental rights are terminated, [the
child] would lose her rights of inheritance from [her mother] and her right to
support from her biological mother." 63 Again, however, the court cites no
authority for this conclusion and makes no mention of the statutory language
describing the effect of a termination of parental rights. The Alaska statute
uses somewhat more constrained language than the Iowa statute, describing
the effect of the order as terminating "the rights and responsibilities of the
parent regarding the child." 64 In yet another case, the Court of Civil Appeals
of Alabama reversed the lower court decision terminating a father's parental
rights. 65 The appellate court noted that termination of parental rights must be
in the best interest of the child and that here "[t]he child's right to current and
future support, including, possibly, payment of a college education, and the
child's right of inheritancefrom thefather, were apparently never considered,

and the child's rights certainly were not protected.

66

While decisions such as

61. In re G.A.Z., No. 01-1103, 2002 WL 575640, *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 20,
2002) (emphasis added).
62. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.2(56) (West 2000 & Supp. 2004).
63. A.B. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 7 P.3d 946, 954-55 (Alaska 2000)
(emphasis added).
64. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.088 (Michie 2004).
65. State ex rel McDaniel v. Miller, 659 So. 2d 640 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995).
66. Id. at 642 (emphasis added). See also In re Elise K., 654 P.2d 253, 258 (Cal.
1982) (Bird, C.J., concurring) ("The termination of parental rights contemplated by
section 232 is the ultimate sanction envisioned by the Legislature. It represents the
total and irrevocable severance of the bond between parent and child. The child's
emotional relationships with his or her natural parent and siblings are cut off. Any
right to parental support or to an inheritance from biological family members is ter-

minated.") (citations omitted). But cf In re Estate of Pamanet, 175 N.W.2d 234 (Wis.
1970). The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the terminated parent's right to inherit
from the child had been extinguished by the termination order. Id. at 235-36. In reach-

ing that conclusion, the court noted that the legislature had previously considered and
rejected a bill that explicitly provided that "[a]n order terminating the parent-child
relationship shall divest the parent and the child of all legal rights, privileges, duties

and obligations, including rights of inheritance,with respect to each other." Id. at 236
n.1 (emphasis added). The rejected statute would, in the words of the court, "have
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these suggest that courts may interpret TPR statutes to extinguish the inheritance rights of the child, they provide little guidance as to why that result
should obtain.
The very few cases that have addressed, either directly or indirectly, the
effect of a Type 3 TPR statute on the inheritance rights of the child, then,
suggest that Type 3 statutes may extinguish the child's right to inherit from
the terminated parent. But, given the paucity of useful judicial precedent on
the issue and the variation in statutory language, it is hard to predict with any
certainty whether all Type 3 statutes will be similarly interpreted. As Type 3
statutes do not explicitly address the effect of termination on the inheritance
rights of the child, the result is likely to turn on interpretation of the more
general language used in the statute to describe the effect of termination. If
the language of the statute is broad and explicitly terminates the rights, obligations, and privileges of both the parent and the child, as was the case with
the Minnesota statute interpreted by the Braa67 court, it may be difficult for
courts to interpret the statute in a way that preserves the child's right to inherit. It is likely that these broader statutes will have the effect of extinguishing the right of the child to inherit from a terminated parent. 68 The only remadded a cutoff of all rights of the child to an existing cutoff of all parental rights in
termination cases," strongly suggesting that the court interpreted the existing statute
not to extinguish the child's right to inherit, although the court explicitly stated that it
need not and did not decide on the rights of the child to inherit in that case. Id. at 236.
67. In re Estate of Braa, 452 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1990). See supra text accompanying notes 57-60.
68. A number of cases have addressed this question-the effect of termination of
parental rights on the rights of the child-in the context of parental support obligations. These cases give us a sense of how courts are likely to answer the question that
concerns us-in the absence of explicit statutory language preserving or extinguishing
a specific right of the child or obligation of the parent, does a termination of parental
rights affect only the rights of the parent (leaving the rights of the child unimpaired)
or does it sever the parent-child relationship entirely, extinguishing not only the rights
of the parent, but also parental obligations and children's rights. In a very recent case,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a termination of parental rights order also
terminates the parent's duty to support the child. McCabe v. McCabe, 78 P.3d 956
(Okla. 2003). The McCabe court noted that in the majority of cases, the courts of
other jurisdictions have held that "absent a statute directing otherwise, an order terminating parental rights severs the parent-child relationship to the degree that the parent
no longer owes a duty to support the child," id. at 960, citing decisions from nineteen
other states in support of the proposition that a termination of parental rights order
terminates the parent's duty to support the child and only three that hold that the parent's obligation to support the child survives termination of parental rights, id. at 960
n.3. Many of the cases holding that termination of parental rights extinguishes the
parent's obligation to support the child use language suggesting that they are giving
very comprehensive effect to the termination order. See State ex rel. Sec'y of Soc. &
Rehab. Servs. v. Clear, 804 P.2d 961, 967 (Kan. 1991) ("A person who has relinquished parental rights through adoption, a voluntary termination of parental rights, or
an involuntary severance of parental rights is no longer a parent. These statutory prohttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss1/8
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edy in such states may be amendment of the statute to provide explicitly (as
Type 1 statutes do) that the child's inheritance rights survive termination.
If, however, the statute provides for termination of parent rights only,
and does not use language referring more broadly to parental obligations or
children's rights or the extinguishing of the parent-child relationship, it will
be easier for courts to construe TPR statutes narrowly, affecting only parental
69
rights and leaving the child's rights unimpaired. If the purpose of terminacedures contemplate a complete severance of the child's ties and relationship with his
or her natural parents. The parent whose rights have been severed is relieved of all
duties and obligations to the child."); Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 562 S.E.2d 327,
329 (Va. Ct. App. 2002), aff'd, 581 S.E.2d 213 (Va. 2003) ("[T]ermination of parental
rights is a complete severance of all ties between the child and parent so as to render
them 'legal strangers' to include the termination of parental responsibilities as well as
any correlative rights."). The careful reader may note that Oklahoma, Kansas, and
Virginia all have Type I statutes and think it puzzling to include cases from Type 1
jurisdictions in a discussion focused on how courts might interpret Type 3 statutes.
The point of the discussion, however, is not how these courts would interpret the
effect of their Type I statutes on inheritance rights, but rather how courts are likely to
interpret the effect of the broader language of TPR on rights of children that are not
explicitly addressed in the statute, for that is the very issue that courts interpreting
Type 3 statutes must answer when they determine the effect of the statute on inheritance rights. When courts in Type I (or Type 2 for that matter) jurisdictions consider
the effect of their statutes on the right of the child to continued support from the terminated parent, they are addressing that very question-how should we apply the
broad language of TPR statutes to the rights and obligations of the parent and the
child.
69. Again, we may draw this inference from the manner in which courts have
applied termination statutes to the child's right to receive support from the terminated
parent. While many courts have held that termination of parental rights extinguishes
the parent's support obligation, see supra note 68, a handful of recent court decisions
have held, to the contrary, that the termination of parental rights order does not extinguish the parent's obligation to support the child. In doing so, these courts have given
a much narrow interpretation to the effect of the termination order. In State v. Fritz,
801 A.2d 679 (R.I. 2002), for example, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the
termination of the father's parental rights did not automatically extinguish his obligation to support his child, noting that the Rhode Island termination of parental rights
statute (a Type 3 statute) authorizes the termination of "any and all legal rights of the
parent to the child," id. at 683 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(a) (2000)), in contrast
to the state's adoption statute that provides for the "legal termination of parental rights
and responsibilities of birth parents," id. at 684 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7.2-2
(2000)). Thus, because the "plain language of Rhode Island's termination of parental
rights statute ... addresses only the 'legal rights of the parent to the child' and not the
reciprocal rights of the child with respect to the parent," the court explicitly declined
to follow other courts that interpreted the term "parental rights" as "incorporating all
the rights of the parental relationship, including not only those rights that flow to the
parent, but also those, such as the right to financial support, that flow to the child." Id.
at 685 (citations omitted). In another very recent case, the West Virginia Supreme
Court held that the parent's obligation to pay child support was not automatically
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
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tion is to further the best interests of the child, as it clearly is, 70 TPR statutes
should be interpreted and applied in a manner that benefits, rather than disadvantages, the child. Courts that interpret statutes that authorize a termination
of parental "rights" as having a substantially broader effect-as, for instance,
requiring the complete severance of the parental bond or making the parent
and child legal strangers-go too far and infect TPR statutes with an unnecessarily draconian character.
If Type 3 statutes are interpreted to bar the right of children to inherit

from their terminated parents, they are likely to be interpreted also to bar
inheritance by children through their terminated parents as well. Thus, a child
of terminated parents would be barred from inheriting not only from the terminated parent, but also from the parents of the terminated parent or siblings
of the terminated parent-i.e., the child's grandparents and aunts and uncles. 7'

III. EXTINGUISHING THE INHERITANCE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
AFTER TPR-Is IT GOOD POLICY?
It appears, then, that an increasing number of children are likely to become "legal orphans," in the sense that the parental rights of their natural

parents have been terminated but the terminated natural parents have not been
replaced by adoptive parents, leaving the children with no legal parent. It also
appears that in all states with Type 2 statutes, and perhaps in many states with

Type 3 statutes as well, termination of parental rights will extinguish the right
of the child to inherit from the terminated parent and likely also from kin of
the terminated parent. Is that a desirable result? In answering that question,

extinguished by a termination of parental rights. In re Stephen Tyler R., 584 S.E.2d
581 (W. Va. 2003). The West Virginia termination statute (again a Type 3 statute)
authorizes the court to "terminate the parental, custodial or guardianship rights and/or
responsibilities of the abusing parent." W. VA. CODE § 49-6-5(a)(6) (Supp. 2003).
The court concluded that the plain language of the statute gave courts the option to
terminate the parent's rights or responsibilities or both. Stephen Tyler R., 584 S.E.2d
at 596. In response to the terminated father's claim that it was "patently unfair" to
continue a parent's obligation to pay support after the parent's right to visit or contact
the child was terminated, the court explained that "'child support payments are exclusively for the benefit and economic best interest of the child,"' and that "'the duty to
pay child support and the right to exercise visitation are not interdependent."' Id. at
598 (quoting Carter v. Carter, 479 S.E.2d 681, 686-87 (W. Va. 1996)).
70. See infra text accompanying notes 72-73.
71. This conjecture flows from the treatment of inheritance rights when a child
has been adopted. In most jurisdictions, adoption extinguishes the adopted child's
right to inherit from her natural parents (except in the case of step-parent adoptions).
See infra text accompanying notes 93-95. When the child's right to inherit from her
natural parents has been extinguished by adoption, the child's right to inherit from the
relatives of the natural parents is generally also extinguished. See Brashier, supra note
49, at 153.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss1/8
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we might first consider how this result comports with the purposes and goals
of the child welfare system as reflected in termination of parental rights statutes.

A. The Policiesof the Child Welfare System
Whatever questions may exist about the efficacy of TPR statutes, there
is no question as to their primary goal-to protect the interest of children.
72
That theme is clearly expressed in the language of the statutes, as well as in
73
court decisions implementing the statutory schemes. While terminating the
parental rights of abusive or neglectful parents may well further the interests
of the child, it is hard to imagine how a concomitant extinguishing of any
potential inheritance from the parent, or from the parent's kin, can in any way
benefit the child. In fact, several courts have noted that the potential loss of
inheritance rights is detrimental to children and suggested that, therefore, the
potential loss of inheritance rights may be itself a factor in determining
whether termination is warranted.74 Thus, it is conceivable (and perhaps

72. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-94(a) (2001 & Supp. 2004) ("If there is
clear and convincing evidence of such parental misconduct or inability, the court shall
then consider whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child,
after considering the physical, mental, emotional, and moral condition and needs of
the child who is the subject of the proceeding, including the need for a secure and
stable home."); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600A.1 (West 2001) ("The best interest of the
child subject to the proceedings of this chapter shall be the paramount consideration
in interpreting this chapter."); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.426(2) (West 2003) ("The best
interests of the child shall be the prevailing factor considered by the court in determining the disposition of all proceedings under this subchapter.").
73. See, e.g., In re C.H., 79 P.3d 822, 825 (Mont. 2003) ("[A] court's paramount
concern in a parental rights termination proceeding is the best interest of the children."); In re Christopher B., 823 A.2d 301, 307 (R.I. 2003) ("'[T]he primary step
before any termination of parental rights is that there be a finding of parental unfitness. Once this fact is established, the best interests of the child outweigh all other
considerations."') (alteration in original) (quoting In re Kristen B., 558 A.2d 200, 203
(R.I. 1989)); In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 547 (Tex. 2003) ("[Tlhe Family Code's
entire statutory scheme for protecting children's welfare focuses on the child's best
interest.").
74. See A.B. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 7 P.3d 946 (Alaska 2000); Hofmeister v. Bauer, 719 P.2d 1220, 1222 n.1 (Idaho 1986) (affirming the lower court's
decree terminating parental rights) ("In constrast to the best interests of the parent, the
best interests of the child must be considered when terminating the relationship under
any provision of I.C. § 16-2005. This requirement is explicitly contained in category
(e) and is implicitly embraced by the criteria of parental conduct or status in categories (a) through (d). It is conceivable, although unlikely, that grounds for termination
could exist under categories (a) through (d) but that a court would refrain from terminating because the child's best interest would not be served. For example, the child
might be deprived of a substantial future inheritance . .
1103, 2002 WL 575640 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2002).

");

In re G.A.Z., No. 01-
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somewhat ironic) that the risk of loss of inheritance rights that would flow
from a termination of parental rights might, in very close cases, result in
courts declining to order termination in circumstances that would, otherwise,
be in the child's best interest.
Rather than benefiting the child, then, barring the child from inheriting
seems to simply inflict one more disadvantage on children whose lives are
likely to have been blighted by the burden of incapable, neglectful, or abusive
parents. This added disadvantage is likely to fall on children who are already
disadvantaged not only because of the failings of their parents, but by minority status and poverty as well. Critics of the existing child welfare system
have argued forcefully that the children in the system are disproportionately
poor and disproportionately minority. Children who have become "legal orphans" as the result of termination of parental rights proceedings are the
product of a child welfare system that is, in the unminced words of Professors
Brooks and Roberts, "marked by striking class and race disparities. ' , 75 Professors Brooks and Roberts marshal quite disturbing statistics in support of their
expressed concern:
Black children make up nearly half of the national foster care
population, although they represent fewer than one fifth of the nation's children. Latino and Native American children are also in
the system in disproportionate numbers. The system's racial imbalance is most apparent in big cities, where there are sizeable minority and foster care populations. In Chicago, for example, 95% of
children in foster care are Black. Of 42,000 children in New York
City's foster care system at the end of 1997, only 1,300 were
White. Black children in New York were 10 times as likely as
White children to be in state protective custody. 76

75. Susan L. Brooks & Dorothy E. Roberts, Social Justice and Family Court
Reform, 40 FAM. CT.REv. 453, 453 (2002). Professors Brooks and Roberts go on to
note that
[c]hildren raised in poverty are many times more likely than other children to be reported to child protective services and to be placed in substitute care. Poverty-not the type or severity of maltreatment-is the single
most important predictor of placement in foster care and the amount of
time spent there. America's child welfare system is rooted in the philosophy of "child saving"--the idea that children should be rescued from the
ills of poverty by taking them away from their parents. Thus, the public
child welfare system often equates poverty with neglect. Most child maltreatment addressed by child protective services involves neglect related
to poverty.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
76. Id. (footnotes omitted).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss1/8

18

2005]

Brown: Brown: Disinheriting the Legal Orphan:
DISINHERITING THE "LEGAL ORPHAN"

Professor Charlow, another critic of the current child welfare system,
contends that"it appears that the system, true to its origins, is removing children simply because they are poor, and because minority children are more
likely to be poor, an inordinate number of them are being separated from their
families without sufficient reason. 77 Similarly, Professor Appell argues that
the current child welfare system "largely7 8targets poor and minority families
and often confuses poverty with neglect.,
Extinguishing the right of the child to inherit from its terminated parent,
then, seems not to further the primary goal of the termination statutesprotecting the interests of the child-but rather to add additional injury to
children who already suffer from inadequate parenting and very likely the
additional burdens of poverty and minority status as well. But might other
valid interests important to our broader inheritance system be served by precluding inheritance by children from their terminated parents? To answer that
question, we turn now to consideration of how extinguishing the child's right
to inherit from his terminated biological parent compares to the other categories of children who might lose (or historically have lost) their right to inherit
from their biological parents.

77. Andrea Charlow, Race, Poverty, and Neglect, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REv.
763, 768-69 (2001). Professor Charlow further notes that
[c]onsistent with its origins, the current child welfare system continues to
remove more poor children from their families than their wealthier counterparts. Maltreatment rates for poor children are over twenty times
greater than those of middle class or wealthy families. As a result, the impact of maltreatment laws is not felt equally by all races-the large number of poor charged with maltreatment results in a disparate impact on minorities. Despite the fact that child maltreatment occurs with the same frequency in all races, the percentage of African-American and NativeAmerican children in the child welfare system is greater than the percentage of those groups in the general population. Given the overrepresentation of minorities living in poverty, it is not surprising that a
disproportionate number of minorities are charged with child maltreatment.
Id. at 764-65 (footnotes omitted).
78. Appell, supra note 42, at 772. Professor Appell bolsters her point by noting
that "of the approximately 560,000 children in state-supervised substitute care, fortytwo percent (239,516) are identified as 'Black Non-Hispanic,' thirty-six percent
(203,000) as 'White Non-Hispanic,' fifteen percent (84,924) as 'Hispanic,' two percent (8,910) as non-Hispanic Native American, and one percent (6,304) as
Asian/Pacific Islander. Most of these children come from poor families." Id. (footnotes omitted).
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B. The Policies of InheritanceLaw
1. The Intestate Succession Scheme
Inheritance rights are created and defined by state intestacy statutes that
exist in every state. 79 Although there is considerable variation among state
intestacy statutes, the right to inherit almost inevitably flows from one of two
relationships-husband and wife or parent and child. 0 Of these two relationships, the parent-child relationship is by far the most significant. Aside from
the share of the surviving spouse, relationships based on marriage generally
do not create inheritance rights under state intestacy statutes.8 1 Marriage creates inheritance rights only in the spouse-in-laws do not inherit under most
intestacy statutes. 82 Once the surviving spouse's share is determined, 83 the

79. WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. & SHELDON F. KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS AND
ESTATES 42 (2nd ed. 2001).
80. There are a very few exceptions to this general rule. Hawaii, by statute, allows persons who are at least eighteen years old and who are not married or parties to
another reciprocal beneficiary relationship and who cannot legally marry one another
to enter into a reciprocal beneficiary relationship. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 572C-1
to -7 (Michie 1999). Under the Hawaii intestate succession statute, a reciprocal beneficiary is entitled to the same share that a surviving spouse would be. HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 560:2-102 (Michie 1999). The Hawaii scheme is briefly discussed in
Susan N. Gary, The Parent-childRelationship Under Intestacy Statutes, 32 U. MEM.
L. REV. 643, 674-77 (2002). The California Probate Code provides for inheritance by
children from their foster parent or stepparent under very limited circumstances (there
must be a "relationship of parent and child" that "began during the person's minority
and continued throughout the joint lifetimes of the person and the person's foster
parent or stepparent" and it must be "established by clear and convincing evidence
that the foster parent or stepparent would have adopted the person but for a legal
barrier.") CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454 (West Supp. 2005). The California step
child/foster child inheritance scheme is discussed in Gary, supra, at 671-74; Kim A.
Feigenbaum, Note, The Changing Family Structure: Challenging Stepchildren's Lack
of Inheritance Rights, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 167 (2000); Thomas M. Hanson, Note,
Intestate Succession for Stepchildren: CaliforniaLeads the Way, But Has It Gone Far
Enough?, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 257 (1995).
81. MCGOVERN, JR. & KURTZ, supra note 79, at 46.

82. There are, however, a few exceptions to this general proposition. The California intestate succession scheme, for instance, extends inheritance rights, in some
circumstances, to step children, CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402(e) (West 1991 & Supp.
2005), and to mothers- and fathers-in-law or their issue, id. § 6402(g). In Nevada,
heirs of a decedent's predeceased spouse may inherit if the decedent died without
heirs. NEV. REV. STAT. 134.210 (2003).
83. State intestate succession statutes vary considerably in their approach to
determining the spousal share, with allocations of from one-third to one-half of the
estate common. The spousal share may, or may not, depend on the number of children, or issue of children, who survive the decedent. JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY
M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 75 (6th ed. 2000).
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disposition of the remainder of the estate is governed almost entirely by relationships based on the parent-child relationship. 4 Generally, surviving children, if there are any, take the remainder of the estate, sharing it with any
issue 85 of children who did not survive the decedent.8 6 If there are no surviving children, or descendants of children, the estate generally passes to the
decedent's parents or, if there are no surviving parents, to other ancestors or
collateral relatives. 8 7 In all of these instances, the relationship between the
decedent and the heir is based on one or more parent-child relationships. In
other words, all eligible heirs (aside from spouses) are connected to the decedent by a chain, with each link in the chain being a single parent-child relationship.
Because inheritance rights (aside from the inheritance rights of the surviving spouse) are invariably based on the parent-child relationship, the determination of who qualifies as a parent or child is of obvious and crucial
importance. At the most fundamental level, we think of a child as being the
offspring of the child's biological, or natural, parents and, in most instances,
the biological parent-child relationship determines inheritance rights.88 There
are, however, limited, but significant, exceptions to this common sense definition. To better understand when, and whether, a judicially ordered termination of parental rights also should constitute an exception to this biologically
based general rule, it may be instructive to put termination of parental rights
into context by briefly exploring the history and rationale of these other exceptions to the rule that inheritance rights are based on the biological link
between parent and child.
2. Adopted Children
Adoption is a major exception to the general rule that biological relationships determine inheritance rights between parents and children.89 Adop84. Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18

LAW &

INEQ. 1, 2 (2000).

85. "Issue" refers to direct descendants, including children, grandchildren, greatgrandchildren, great-great-grandchildren, etc. MCGOVERN, JR. & KURTZ, supra note
79, at 6.
86. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 83, at 86.
87. Id. at 90-91.
88. That notion is reflected in § 2-114(a) of the Uniform Probate Code, which
provides that "[e]xcept as provided in subsections (b) and (c), for purposes of intestate
succession by, through, or from a person, an individual is the child of his (or her]
natural parents." UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(a) (amended 1993).
89. For comprehensive discussions of the inheritance rights of adopted children,
see Brashier, supra note 49, at 147-77 and Jan Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get What and Why (The Impact of Adoptions,
Adult Adoptions, and Equitable Adoptions on Intestate Succession and Class Gifts),
37 VAND. L. REv. 711 (1984).
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tion raises several related questions. When will adopted children inherit from,
or through, their adoptive parents? When will adopted children inherit from,
or through, their biological parents despite the adoption?
The answer to the first of these questions (when will adopted children
inherit from, or through, their adoptive parents) is the most straightforward.
In every American jurisdiction, adopted children inherit from their adoptive
parents. 90 And in most jurisdictions, adopted children also inherit through
their adoptive parents, which is to say that adopted children inherit not just
from the adoptive parents, but also from the adoptive parents' kin, in the
same manner as the natural children of the adoptive parents would.9 1 In a very
few states, however, adopted children are barred from inheriting from their
adoptive parents' kin, who are viewed as "strangers to the adoption. 92
The answer to the second question (will adoption extinguish the right of
the adopted child to inherit from his biological parents), however, is considerably more unsettled and controversial. This second question is also more
relevant to the basic question raised in this Article-should termination of
parental rights extinguish the right of the child to inherit from his biological
parents. In some jurisdictions, the right of the adopted child to inherit from
his biological parents is unaffected by the adoption.93 In most jurisdictions,
however, the ability of the adopted child to inherit from his biological parents
is terminated by the adoption, unless the adoption is by a step-parent, in
which case the child may retain the right to inherit from the biological parent
who is married to the adopting step-parent 94 or from both biological parents. 95
Why do most intestate succession statutes terminate the right of adopted
children to inherit from their biological parents? Several reasons are suggested. One is fairness. If adopted children retain the right to inherit from
their biological parents as well as from their adopted parents, they will be
unfairly advantaged over their siblings (the biological children of their adoptive parents) who can inherit only from their biological parents.9 6 Allowing
adopted children to retain the right to inherit from their biological families

90. See Brashier, supra note 49, at 149-50.
91. MCGOVERN, JR. & KURTZ, supra note 79, at 92.
92. See Brashier, supranote 49, at 154. For an articulation of the "stranger to the
adoption rule," see In re Eddins' Estate, 279 N.W. 244 (S.D. 1938). See Rein, supra
note 89, at 721-23 for criticism of the Eddins decision. The Vermont Supreme Court,
in MacCallum v. Seymour, 686 A.2d 935 (Vt. 1996), held that the Vermont statute
that precluded an adopted child from inheriting from the kin of her adopted parents
violated the Vermont constitution. But see Lutz v. Fortune, 758 N.E.2d 77 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2001).
93. Rein, supra note 89, at 723.
94. Brashier, supra note 49, at 155.
95. Id.
96. Rein, supra note 89, at 725.
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also creates administrative complications. If adoption 97records are sealed, the
identity of potential heirs may be difficult to ascertain.
An additional, and probably more substantive, rationale relates to the
goals and purposes of adoption. A frequently articulated goal of adoption is to
promote the complete integration of the adopted child into the adoptive family, which, in turn, will be enhanced by severing ties with the biological fainily. 98 These rationales for severing inheritance rights of adopted children and
their biological parents are much less persuasive, however, when the child is
adopted by step-parents or other relatives. 99 Ties to the child's biological
family are much more likely to be maintained, and the continuation of those
ties is much less problematic, when the child has been adopted by a stepparent or other relative. And issues of administrative efficiency, such as determining the identity of potential heirs, are much less likely to arise. Consequently, many of the intestate succession statutes that cut off the inheritance
right of adopted children to inherit from their biological parents create an
exception for intra-family adoptions. Some such statutes allow the adopted
child to continue to inherit from the biological parent who is the spouse of the
adopting parent, 100 while others allow the adopted child to continue to adopt
from both biological parents in the event of a step-parent adoption.' 0'
In most jurisdictions, then, adopted children inherit from their adoptive
parents and their adoptive parents' kin, but are barred from inheriting from
their natural parents and their natural parents' kin, except in cases of stepparent adoptions. We do this for important policy reasons. We want adopted
children to be fully integrated into their new families, a goal which is furthered by severing relationships with their biological families and by treating
adopted children fairly in relation to their siblings in their new adoptive family. Exceptions (such as allowing the child to retain inheritance rights from

97. Id. at 724.
98. Id. at 717. Perhaps the leading case expressing this approach is In re Estates
of Donnelly, 502 P.2d 1163 (Wash. 1972). In Donnelly, the question before the Washington Supreme Court was whether an adopted child could inherit from her biological
grandfather. Id. The court held that the child could not inherit, because allowing inheritance would conflict with the "broad legislative objective of giving the adopted
child a 'fresh start' by treating him as the natural child of the adoptive parent, and
severing all ties with the past." Id. at 1166. Some commentators, however, have argued that "open" adoptions, in which the child retains ties with the birth parent, may
be preferable in some circumstances, particularly in the event of a step-parent adoption. See Annette Ruth Appell, The Move Toward Legally Sanctioned Cooperative
Adoption: Can It Survive the Uniform Adoption Act?, 30 FAM. L.Q. 483 (1996); Margaret M. Mahoney, Open Adoption in Context: The Wisdom and Enforceability of
Visitation Ordersfor FormerParents Under Uniform Adoption Act § 4-113, 51 FLA.
L. REv. 89 (1999).

99. Rein, supra note 89, at 730.
100. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-207(a) (2001).
101. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(b) (amended 1993).
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their natural parents after step-parent adoptions) exist primarily when they are
consistent with this policy.
Are the rationales for cutting off the adopted child's right to inherit from
his or her biological parents transferable to termination of parental rights?
The primary rationale for extinguishing the right of an adopted child to inherit
from biological family members is that it furthers the goal of integrating the
child into the new, adoptive family.' 0 2 In fact, inheritance rights from biological parents are often retained in those instances in which separation from the
biological family does not seem an appropriate goal-most notably, stepparent adoptions. That "integration into the adoptive family" rationale, however, is simply inapplicable to termination of parental right proceedings in
which there is no replacement family into which the child can be integrated.
The very nature of the children we are concerned with-legal orphans whose
biological parents' rights have been terminated but who have not been subsequently adopted-negatives any suggestion that the "integration" rationale
might be apt.
Similarly, extinguishing the right of adopted children to inherit from
their biological families has been rationalized as an exercise in fairness, preventing the adopted child from having inheritance rights from three or four
parents and their families, while the child's siblings in the new family (the
natural children of the adopted parents) have inheritance rights only from two
parents.1° 3 Again, however, that rationale is inapplicable to terminations of
parental rights, where there are no disadvantaged siblings in the adoptive
family because there is no adoptive family. Further, cutting off inheritance
rights in conjunction with a termination of parental rights leaves the child
with inheritance rights from only one parent (if the parental rights of only one
parent are terminated) or from no parent at all (if the parental rights of both
parents are terminated). Any notion of unfair advantage seems totally inapt in
this context.
3. Non-marital Children
The second, and longest standing (although it remains standing only in
vestigial form) exception to the general rule that the biological parent-child
relationship determines inheritance rights is non-marital children. Historically, non-marital children (those often referred to with varying degrees of
condescension and contempt as children born out of wedlock, illegitimates, or
bastards 1 4 ) could not inherit from either biological parent, nor could parents
102. See supra text accompanying note 98.
103. See supra text accompanying note 96.
104. The nomenclature has evolved quite dramatically. From the time of Blackstone, who noted that a bastard "can inherit nothing, being looked upon as the son of
nobody, and sometimes called filius nullius, somes filius populi," 1 WILLIAM
*447, well into the twentieth century, the term "bastard" was prevalent. See Chester G. Vernier & Edwin P. Churchill, Inheritanceby and
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
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inherit from their non-marital children. 10 5 Similarly, kin of the biological
parents could not inherit from the child, nor could kin of the child inherit
from the biological parents. For inheritance purposes, the 10non-marital
child
6
was considered to be "filius nullius," or the child of no one.
What possible rationales exist, or existed, for a rule that is, to modem
minds, so perverse? Several rationales have been suggested by scholars. Professors McGovern and Kurtz, in their treatise on wills, trusts, and estates, have
suggested, and largely discounted, four possible rationales for the rule. 10 7 The
first such rationale is feudalism.108 Barring non-marital children from inheriting
caused tenants to die without heirs, which in turn resulted in property escheating to the lord. 10 9 Thus, the theory goes, the barring of inheritance by nonmarital children was supported by lords in order to increase the likelihood that
land would escheat to them." 0 Professors McGovern and Kurtz, however, view
this rationale as improbable because other legitimate heirs would likely exist,
preventing the hoped-for escheat to the lord."' Even if the feudal rationale
were not implausible, a policy aimed at increasing the rate at which property
escheated would hardly be persuasive to modem minds.
The second possible rationale offered by Professors McGovern and
Kurtz is the deterrence of sinful behavior." 2 Again, however, the proffered
rationale fails as a legitimate contemporary justification. The notion that exfrom Bastards, 20 IOWA L. REv. 216 (1934-1935). Bastard was replaced by "illegitimate," but that term also came to be viewed as inappropriate and came to be replaced
in turn by "children born out of wedlock" or, to use the common contemporary designation, "non-marital children." See Karen A. Hauser, Comment, Inheritance Rights
for Extramarital Children: New Science Plus Old Intermediate Scrutiny Add Up to
the Need for Change, 65 U. CIN. L. REv. 891, 891 n.1 (1997). Long lost are some
wonderfully evocative terms for non-marital children, such as "merry-begot," 9
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 641 (2d ed. 1989) (the usage being illustrated by this
1890 quotation from Sir Hall Caine's novel Bondman: "Maybe you think it nice to
bring up your daughter with the merry-begot of any ragabash that comes prowling
along.") and "by-blow," 2 id. at 731 (the usage being illustrated with this quotation
from Henry Fielding's Tom Jones: "I thought he was a gentleman's son, thof he was a
by-blow.").
105. For a comprehensive discussion of the inheritance rights of non-marital children, see Brashier, supra note 49. See also MCGOVERN, JR. & KURTZ, supra note 79,
at 82-91.
106. Non-marital children were frequently disadvantaged not simply for inheritance, but in a variety of other contexts as well, including support, use of the father's
name, and state and federal welfare statutes. See Harry D. Krause, Equal Protection
for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REv. 477 (1967).
107. MCGOVERN, JR. & KURTZ, supra note 79, at 82-84.
108. Id. at 82-83.
109. Id.
110. Id.

1i1. Id.
112. Id. at 83.
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tra-marital sexual activity is seriously sinful has largely gone out of fashion. 13 And, to the extent that deterring such activity is appropriate public
policy, it can hardly be argued that punishing the child who results from the
illicit activity, rather than the adults who engaged in that activity, is anything
but grossly unfair. 14 Further, it strains credibility to suppose that the specter
of inheritance disabilities imposed on offspring resulting from extra-marital
sex would in fact act to deter the participants.1 5 As we will discuss in Part
IV, statutes that impose disabilities on children because of the misconduct of
their parents are constitutionally suspect as well.
Neither of these rationales for disinheriting non-marital children suggests any viable justification for the analogous disinheritance of children of
terminated parents. We surely cannot justify disinheriting children of terminated parents on feudal grounds. Similarly, disinheriting children of terminated parents on the assumption that we would thereby be deterring bad parenting seems implausible, as well as potentially unconstitutional.
The third possible rationale suggested by Professors McGovern and
Kurtz is based upon parental intent.' 6 The notion here is that the average
decedent would not have intended or desired non-marital offspring to inherit. 17 It is axiomatic that a primary goal of intestate succession statutes is to
replicate the presumed intention of the decedent.' Professors McGovern and
Kurtz deem the presumed parental intent rational improbable, noting that
there is no reason to suppose that parents in the past did not love even their
illegitimate children." 9 Similarly, Professor Krause has suggested that legal
disabilities attaching to "illegitimacy" may result from an honoring of the
father's choice.
Professor Krause, like Professors McGovern and Kurtz,
finds this rationale unsatisfactory, arguing that, as the father voluntarily inflicted this status on the helpless child, the decision to withhold the benefits
of legitimacy cannot properly belong to the father.' 2' The Supreme Court, in
fact, has criticized the use of the presumed parental intent as a rationale for
113. Id.
114. Id.; see also Krause, supra note 106, at 492; see also infra text accompanying notes 238-48, for a discussion of the United States Supreme Court's expressed
concern in this particular form of unfairness.
115. MCGOVERN, JR. & KURTZ, supra note 79, at 83; Krause, supra note 106, at
492.
116. MCGOVERN, JR. & KURTZ, supra note 79, at 83.
117. Id.
118. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 83, at 74; Mary Louise Fellows et
aL., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession
Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J., 321, 323-24.

119. MCGOVERN, JR. & KURTZ, supra note 79, at 83.
120. Krause, supra note 106, at 495-98. Professor Krause's article focuses not just
on inheritance rights, but on the broad range of legal disabilities inflicted upon nonmarital children.
12 1. Id. at 497.
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discrimination against illegitimates. In Trimble v. Gordon,122 which is discussed at greater length in Part IV of this Article, the Court confronted the
argument that a statute which barred illegitimate children from inheriting
from their fathers reflected the presumed intent of parents. The Court responded by noting that:
[e]ven if one assumed that a majority of the citizens of the State
preferred to discriminate against their illegitimate children, the sentiment hardly would be unanimous. . . .The issue therefore becomes where the burden of inertia in writing a will is to fall. At
least when the disadvantaged group has been a frequent target of
discrimination, as illegitimates have, we doubt that a State constitutionally may place the burden
on that group by invoking the the123
ory of "presumed intent."
Just as the "presumed intent" rationale seems an inadequate justification
for disinheriting non-marital children, it seems an inadequate justification for
disinheriting children of terminated parents. We have no reason to presume
that terminated parents would, in fact, intend to disinherit their children. Even
terminated parents are likely to love their children. Furthermore, many parents whose parental rights are terminated are not "bad" parents at all, but
rather parents who are unable to provide adequate parenting because of mental illness, drug or alcohol dependency, or incarceration. 24 In the face of uncertainty as to parental intent, it seems perverse to impose presumptions that
harm the innocent child. Additionally, the effect of TPR statutes that disinherit children is to bar inheritance not just from the terminated parent, but
from the terminated parent's family as well.125 It seems far-fetched to presume that the grandparents of a child would intend to disinherit the child simply because the child's parent's rights had been terminated.
The fourth suggested rationale-the problem of proving paternity 126is, or, at least was, the most plausible explanation for the disinheritance of
illegitimate children. Although the basic laws of human reproduction make
proof of maternity relatively easy, proof of paternity has been, by the nature
of human reproduction, subject to much greater uncertainty."' This fourth

122.
123.
124.
125.

430 U.S. 762 (1977).
Id. at 775 n.16.
See 1 HOLLINGER, supra note 8, § 4.04[1][a][v]-[vii].
See supra text accompanying note 71.
126. MCGOVERN, JR. & KURTZ, supra note 79, at 83-84.
127. Recent scientific advances in paternity testing, however, have dramatically
reduced that uncertainty. Id. at 84. See also Allan Z. Litovsky & Kirsten Schultz,
Scientific Evidence of Paternity: A Survey of State Statutes, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 79
(1998); Laura W. Morgan, An Introduction to Attacking Blood Tests in Paternity
Cases, 12 AM. J. FAM. L. 204 (1998); Jill T. Phillips, Comment, Who Is My Daddy?
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rationale retains some life in current law, albeit in much attenuated form, in
statutory requirements that condition inheritance from non-marital fathers
on appropriate and timely proof of paternity. 28 Statutory requirements prescribing how paternity may be established and when it must be established
vary considerably from state to state.129 As a result, the ability of a nonmarital child to inherit from the father and the extent to which states may
impose requirements on non-marital children to establish paternity as a
condition of inheriting remain issues of some complexity.
The need to establish whether a father-child relationship in fact exists
provides a plausible rationale for imposing additional burdens (requirements
that non-marital children establish paternity by appropriate means and within
appropriate time periods) on illegitimate children. That proof of paternity
rationale, however, cannot support extinguishing the child's inheritance rights
in a termination of parental rights proceeding, which is a proceeding that by
its very nature presupposes the existence of an identified parent. One could
argue, however, that extinguishing the inheritance rights of these children
simplifies and expedites the process of estate administration in another way.
If parental rights have been terminated, the argument would go, it is likely
that contact between the child and the parent will be severed. Therefore, when
the parent dies, the child may be unlocatable by, or even unknown to, the
administrator of the estate, particularly if the parent dies many years after the
termination proceeding.
The argument that extinguishing the inheritance rights of all children of
terminated parents is justified by a need to simplify and expedite the estate
administration process is unpersuasive. Certainly, some children of terminated parents may be less easily identified and located after the death of the
parent (especially a death that occurs many years after the termination) than
most children of parents whose legal relationship with their children was not
severed. It is far from certain, however, that all (or even most) children of
terminated parents will be unknown to the estate administrator. Estates are
likely to be administered by relatives of the decedent, who are also relatives
of the terminated child and thus likely to be aware at least of the child's existence. To the extent that the child is unlocatable, which is more likely, statutory provisions for notice by publication and statutes of limitations applicable
to probate proceedings generally can protect the estate administration process
against this limited category of unlocatable heirs in a satisfactory and much
less draconian manner.130

Using DNA to Help Resolve Post-deathPaternityCases, 8 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 151
(1997).
128. See Brashier, supra note 49, at 113-42.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., Little v. Smith, 943 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1997).
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IV. EXTINGUISHING THE INHERITANCE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
AFTER TPR-Is IT CONSTITUTIONAL?
Because of the weakness of most of the rationales underlying the common law rule that treated non-marital children as "filius nullius," the rule has
been of diminishing vigor for many years. By the early twentieth century, in
fact, non-marital children inherited from their mothers in nearly all U.S. jurisdictions.
Non-marital children can now inherit from their fathers, as
well, although in many states their right to inherit from their fathers is conditioned on the child establishing paternity. 132 Much of the change in the right
of non-marital children to inherit from their biological fathers has been driven
by a series of United States Supreme Court decisions in which legal disabilities imposed on the children of non-marital fathers were challenged on equal
protection grounds. As we will see, this series of illegitimacy cases established that classifications based on illegitimacy are subject to intermediate
scrutiny when challenged on equal protection grounds. In the most significant
of these cases for our purposes, Trimble v. Gordon,' 33 the Court struck down
a statute that precluded inheritance from their fathers by illegitimate children.' 34 This Part will provide an overview of the illegitimacy cases and then
suggest that TPR statutes that extinguish the right of children to inherit from
their terminated parents may similarly violate the Equal Protection Clause.

A. The Illegitimacy Cases-The History of ConstitutionalChallenges
to DiscriminationAgainst Non-marital Children
The Court began to critically scrutinize classifications based on illegitimacy 135 in Levy v. Louisiana'36 in 1968 and Weber v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co.13 7 in 1972. In Levy, the Court struck down provisions of a Louisi13 1. McGovERN, JR. & KURTZ, supra note 79, at 85. See also Vernier & Churchill, supra note 104, at 216-17.
132. MCGOVERN, JR. & KURTZ, supra note 79, at 85-86.
133. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
134. Id.
135. 1 use the term "illegitimate" rather than the currently preferred "non-marital
children" in this segment of the discussion because that is the term used in the cases
being discussed. See supra note 104 for a brief discussion of the evolution of the
terminology used to denominate children who are born of unwed parents.
136. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
137. 406 U.S. 164 (1972). Between Levy in 1968 and Weber in 1972, the Court
decided another illegitimacy case, Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), in which
the Court upheld a Louisiana statute which allowed inheritance by an illegitimate
child, even though acknowledged by the father, only when there were no other surviving descendants, ancestors, or collateral relations. Labine, however, appears to have
been relegated to the status of an aberration in the development of law in the illegitimacy cases. The Court in Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), said of Labine that
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ana wrongful death statute that denied recovery by unacknowledged illegitimate children for the death of a parent. 138 In Weber, the Court invalidated,
again on equal protection grounds, a provision of the Louisiana workmen's
children the
compensation laws that denied unacknowledged illegitimate
39
children.'
legitimate
to
afforded
rights
recovery
same
Several themes that run through the later illegitimacy cases first appear
in Levy and Weber. Although the Court did not explicitly adopt a heightened
level of scrutiny for classifications based on illegitimacy, it did engage in a
more critical assessment of the fit between the classification and legitimate
state interests than would seem warranted under the low level rational basis
test. 140 These early illegitimacy cases also evince a suspicion of classifications that act to punish children for the wrongful acts of their parents, a suspicion that has subsisted throughout the Court's illegitimacy cases and that
seems to underlie the enhanced scrutiny applied by the Court. The Court, in
Levy, found that the statutory discrimination against illegitimate children
violated the Equal Protection Clause in large part because "[l]egitimacy or
illegitimacy of birth has no relation to the nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother" and that "it is invidious to discriminate against them
when no action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the

it "is difficult to place in the pattern of this Court's equal protection decisions, and
subsequent cases have limited its force as a precedent." Id. at 767 n.12. Commentators, as well, have discounted the significance of Labine. See JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 812-13 (6th ed. 2000) ("[T]he opinion

is almost indecipherable. It applies the equal protection analysis only in a footnote
and spends the entire text on a discussion of why these laws should be beyond the
reach of the equal protection guarantee, a position with no support in any case prior to
or following this one.") (footnote omitted).
138. Levy, 391 U.S. 68.
139. Weber,406 U.S. 164.

For the purposes of recovery under workmen's compensation, Louisiana
law defines children to include "only legitimate children, stepchildren,
posthumous children, adopted children, and illegitimate children acknowledged under the provisions of Civil Code Articles 203, 204, and
205." Thus, legitimate children and acknowledged illegitimates may recover on an equal basis. Unacknowledged illegitimate children, however,
are relegated to the lesser statute of "other dependents" under § 1232(8) of
the workmen's compensation statute and may recover only if there are not
enough surviving dependents in the preceding classifications to exhaust
the maximum allowable benefits.
Id. at 167-68 (footnotes omitted). The decedent's four legitimate children received the
maximum allowable compensation, leaving nothing for the decedent's two illegitimate children. Id. at 167.
140. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 137, at 810 ("In a series of decisions
since 1968 [referring to Levy] the Court has employed a standard of review that must
be implied from its rulings.").
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harm that was done the mother."' 4' That concern was evidenced in Weber as
well, when the Court criticized the illogic and injustice of imposing on illegitimate
children the societal disapproval of the illicit liaisons of their par14 2
ents.
Another theme that recurs throughout later illegitimacy cases first appears in Weber-the Court's impatience with statutes that provide no mechanism for the child to avoid the burdens imposed by her status as illegitimate. 43 That theme became apparent in the flurry of Supreme Court decisions addressing illegitimacy that followed close on the heels of Weber. In
Gomez v. Perez,144 decided the year after Weber, the Court struck down on
equal protection grounds Texas laws that imposed a duty on fathers to support
their legitimate children but denied to illegitimate children a judicially enforceable right to paternal support. 145 The Court acknowledged the existence
of proof of paternity problems, but concluded that those problems cannot "be
made into an impenetrable barrierthat works to shield otherwise invidious
147
discrimination." 46 In New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill,
also decided in 1973, the Court held that provisions of the New Jersey Assistance to Families of the Working Poor program that "operate[d] almost invariably to deny benefits to illegitimate children while granting benefits to
149
148
those children who are legitimate"' violated the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court then decided two cases in which provisions of the Social Security Act that discriminated against illegitimate children were challenged.
These cases, as well, evince the Court's continuing concern with statutes that
141. Levy, 391 U.S. at 72 (footnotes omitted).
142. Weber, 406 U.S. at 175;
143. The Louisiana workmen's compensation law advantaged legitimate children
and acknowledged illegitimates over unacknowledged illegitimates. Id. at 167-68. As
the Court noted, the Louisiana law provided no mechanism that would have allowed
the affected children to change their status from unacknowledged to acknowledge. Id.
at 171. "Under Louisiana law [the father] could not have acknowledged his illegitimate children even had he desired to do so. The burdens of illegitimacy, already
weighty, become doubly so when neither parent nor child can legally lighten them."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
144. 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (per curiam).
145. Id.
The Court of Civil Appeals has held in this case that nowhere in this
elaborate statutory scheme does the State recognize any enforceable duty
on the part of the biological father to support his illegitimate children and
that, absent a statutory duty to support, the controlling law is the Texas
common-law rule that illegitimate children, unlike legitimate children,
have no legal right to support from their fathers.
Id. at 536-37.
146. Id. at 538 (emphasis added).
147. 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (per curiam).
148. Id. at 619-20 (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 621.
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absolutely or conclusively deny benefits to illegitimate children. In Jimenez v.
Weinberger,150 the Court held that provisions of the Social Security scheme
that denied benefits to some illegitimate children of disabled parents, but
provided benefits to legitimate children and other categories of illegitimate
children' 5' violated equal protection guarantees of the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. The Court was clearly troubled by the fact that those
illegitimate children who were denied benefits were denied "any opportunity...
to establish their 'claim' to support and, hence, their right to eligibility.' 52
While acknowledging the government's interest in preventing spurious
claims, the Court concluded that it could not accept
that the blanket and conclusive exclusion of appellants' subclass of
illegitimates is reasonably related to the prevention of spurious
claims. Assuming that the appellants are in fact dependent on the
claimant, it would not serve the purposes of the Act to conclusively
establish their dependency and their
deny them an opportunity to
53
right to insurance benefits.
In contrast, in Mathews v. Lucas, 54 decided two years later, the Court upheld
provisions of the Social Security Act "that condition[ed] the eligibility of
certain illegitimate children for a surviving child's insurance benefits upon a
showing that the deceased wage earner was the claimant child's parent and, at
the time of his death, was living with the child or was contributing to his support" while affording a presumption of dependency to legitimate children and
to some categories of illegitimate children. 55 The Court distinguished
150. 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
151. Id. at 635-36 ("[A]fterbom illegitimate children are divided into two subclassifications under this statute. One subclass is made up of those (a) who can inherit
under state intestacy laws, or (b) who are legitimated under state law, or (c) who are
illegitimate only because of some formal defect in their parents' ceremonial marriage.
These children are deemed entitled to receive benefits under the Act without any
showing that they are in fact dependent upon their disabled parent. The second subclassification of afterborn illegitimate children includes those who are conclusively
denied benefits because they do not fall within one of the foregoing categories and are
not entitled to receive insurance benefits under any other provision of the Act.").
152. Id. at 635.
153. Id. at 636 (emphasis added).
154. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
155. Id. at 497.
A child is considered dependent for this purpose if the insured father was
living with or contributing to the child's support at the time of death. Certain children, however, are relieved of the burden of such individualized
proof of dependency. Unless the child has been adopted by some other individual, a child who is legitimate, or a child who would be entitled to inherit personal property from the insured parent's estate under the applicable state intestacy law, is considered to have been dependent at the time of
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Jimenez and earlier illegitimacy cases because "this conclusiveness in denying benefits to some classes of afterborn illegitimate children ... is absent
here, for, as we have noted, any otherwise eligible child may qualify for survivorship benefits
by showing contribution to support, or cohabitation, at the
' 56
time of death."'
The two most significant cases for our purpose (because they deal expressly with inheritance rights) were Trimble v. Gordon 57 and Lalli v.
Lalli, 58 decided in 1977 and 1978 respectively. In Trimble, the illegitimate
daughter of an intestate father challenged the constitutionality of a provision
of the Illinois Probate Act which allowed illegitimate children to inherit only
from their mothers, while legitimate children were able to inherit from both
parents.159 Illegitimate children could inherit from their fathers, however, if
the father and mother married and the father acknowledged the child, thereby
legitimizing the child. 6° The Court struck down the Illinois statute as violating the Equal Protection Clause.'61
The level of scrutiny applied by the Trimble Court was not made explicit
in the opinion. The Court declined to declare classifications based on illegitimacy "suspect," which would trigger strict scrutiny, but rather required that
the "'statutory classification bear some rational relationship to a legitimate
state purpose.""1 62 That language, taken alone, would seem to suggest that the
Court was poised to apply rational basis scrutiny, but that was not the case.
the parent's death. Even lacking this relationship under state law, a child,
unless adopted by some other individual, is entitled to a presumption of
dependency if the decedent, before death, (a) had gone through a marriage
ceremony with the other parent, resulting in a purported marriage between
them which, but for a nonobvious legal defect, would have been valid, or
(b) in writing had acknowledged the child to be his, or (c) had been decreed by a court to be the child's father, or (d) had been ordered by a court
to support the child because the child was his.
Id. at 498-99.
156. Id. at 512 (emphasis added).
157. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
158. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
159. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 763-64. The Illinois statute provided that
An illegitimate child is heir of his mother and of any maternal ancestor,
and of any person from whom his mother might have inherited, if living;
and the lawful issue of an illegitimate person shall represent such person
and take, by descent, any estate which the parent would have taken, if living. A child who was illegitimate whose parents inter-marry and who is
acknowledged by the father as the father's child is legitimate.
Id. at 764-65 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. C.3, § 12 (1973) (current version at 755 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-2 (West 1992 & Supp. 2004)).
160. Id. at 765 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. C.3, § 12).
161. Id. at 776.
162. Id. at 766-67 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172
(1972)).
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The Court immediately went on to note that "[i]n this context, the standard
just stated is a minimum; the Court sometimes requires more."' 6 3 While recognizing that classifications on the basis of illegitimacy do "fall in a 'realm of
less than strictest scrutiny," ' 64 the Court made clear that the appropriate level
of scrutiny was "'not a toothless one."' 165 The Trimble court did not use the
term "intermediate scrutiny" to describe the level of review it applied, but
later Court decisions have made clear that classifications based on illegitimacy, like those based on gender, do warrant an intermediate level of scrutiny
between the strict scrutiny required of classifications based on race or national origin or those affecting fundamental rights and the lowest level of
governmental purpose, appliscrutiny, a rational relationship to a legitimate
66
cable to all other statutory classifications.1
The Illinois Supreme Court, in upholding the statute, had held that the
act was supported by two important state interests: "'promotion of [legitimate] family relationships ' "1 67 and "'establish[ing] a method of property disposition. ' ' ' 168 The United States Supreme Court, however, concluded that
neither interest sustained the statute. The Court made short shrift of the first
interest. While the Court acknowledged the "appropriateness of Illinois' concern with the family unit, ' ' 16 9 it concluded that "the difference in the rights of
illegitimate children in the estates of their mothers and their fathers appears to
70
The
be unrelated to the purpose of promoting family relationships."'
the
wrongfor
children
innocent
punish
Court's impatience with statutes that
72
is again
doing of their parents, expressed earlier in Levy 17' and Weber,
that
it previevident throughout this portion of the opinion. The Court noted
may
State
that
a
ously had "expressly considered and rejected the argument
attempt to influence the actions of men and women by imposing sanctions on

163. Id. at 767.
164. Id. (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976)).
165. Id. (quoting Mathews, 427 U.S. at 510)).
166. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
This standard of intermediate scrutiny, which falls between the rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny test in terms of the strictness of the
judicial review of classification, was not formally adopted for illegitimacy
classifications until 1988. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's pre-1988
decisions are consistent with this form of intermediate standard of review.
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 137, at 807 (footnote omitted).
167. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 768 (quoting In re Estate of Karas, 329 N.E.2d 234, 238
(Ill. 1975)) (alteration in original).

168. Id. at 770 (quoting In re Estate of Karas, 329 N.E.2d at 238) (alteration in
original).
169. Id. at 769.
170. Id. at 768 n.13.
171. See supra text accompanying note 141.
172. See supra text accompanying note 142.
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the children born of their illegitimate relationships"'1 73 and that "parents have
the ability to conform their conduct to societal norms, but their illegitimate
children can affect neither their parents' conduct nor their own status."', 74 In
making this point, the Court quoted at some length language from Weber
on illegitimate
highlighting the illogic and injustice of imposing disabilities
75
children because of the misconduct of their parents. 1
The Court agreed that the second interest articulated by the Illinois Supreme Court, establishing a method of property disposition, was substantial
and acknowledged that the "serious problems of proving paternity might justify a more demanding standard for illegitimate children claiming under their
fathers' estates than that required either for illegitimate children claiming
under their mothers' estates or for legitimate children generally."' 176 The
Court also acknowledged that "judicial deference is appropriate when the
challenged statute involves the 'substantial state interest in providing for "the
stability of ... land titles and in the prompt and definitive determination of
the valid ownership of property left by decedents.. ' ''" 177 However, the Court
qualified that deference, stating that "there is a point beyond which such deference cannot justify discrimination" and that "statutes involving the disposition of property at death are not immunized from equal protection scrutiny.' 178 Despite the acknowledged importance of the state interest in the
disposition of property at death, the Court required that the statute be "'carefully tuned to alternative considerations, ' , 179 a requirement unlikely to be
applied by a court utilizing rational basis scrutiny. The Court concluded that
the state's rationale failed to support the statute because "[d]ifficulties of
proving paternity in some situations do not justify the total statutory disinheritance of illegitimate children whose fathers die intestate."'' 0 The Illinois
court was criticized for failing to recognize "the possibility of a middle
ground between the extremes of complete exclusion and case-by-case determination of paternity."' 8' The inheritance rights of "at least some significant
categories of illegitimate children of intestate men"'18 2 can be protected
"without jeopardizing the orderly settlement of estates or the dependability of
titles to property passing under intestacy laws."' 83 Thus, the Illinois statute
173. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 769.
174. Id. at 770.
175. Id. at 770-71.
176. Id. at 770.
177. Id. at 767 n.12 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 170
(1972) (quoting Labine v. Vincent (Succession of Vincent), 229 So. 2d 449, 452 (La.
Ct. App. 1969), affd, 401 U.S. 532 (1971))).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 772 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 513 (1976)).
180. Id. (emphasis added).
181. Id. at 770-71.
182. Id. at 771.
183. Id.
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failed constitutional muster "[b]ecause it excludes those categories of illegitimate children unnecessarily.' ' 184 Although the Court did not use the term
"overinclusive," it was clearly focusing on the overinclusiveness of the Illinois statute's disinheritance of illegitimate children.
The Trimble decision seemed to suggest that while a complete or near
complete prohibition on paternal inheritance by illegitimate children was
unconstitutional, more tailored restrictions on the ability of illegitimate children to inherit from their fathers might survive even the heightened scrutiny
applied in Trimble. That supposition was borne out the following year by
Lalli v. Lalli, 1 5 which challenged on equal protection grounds the constitutionality of a New York statute that provided that illegitimate children inherited from their mothers but inherited from their fathers only if a court determination of paternity had been made during the lifetime of the father.' 86 The
Illinois statute struck down in Trimble and the New York statute challenged
in Lalli were indeed quite different in scope. The Illinois statute had made
both "legitimation of the child through the intermarriage of the parents" and
"the father's acknowledgment of paternity" absolute conditions if the child
was to qualify as an heir of the natural father 187 and thus "effected a total
statutory disinheritanceof children born out of wedlock who were not legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their parents."' 188 In contrast, the New
York statute treated the subsequent marital status of the parents as immaterial
and imposed only an "evidentiary" requirement that the paternity of the father

184. Id.
185. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
186. The New York statutes provided that:
(a) For the purposes of this article: (1) An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his mother so that he and his issue inherit from his mother
and from his maternal kindred. (2) An illegitimate child is the legitimate
child of his father so that he and his issue inherit from his father if a court
of competent jurisdiction has, during the lifetime of the father, made an
order of filiation declaring paternity in a proceeding instituted during the
pregnancy of the mother or within two years from the birth of the child.
(3) The existence of an agreement obligating the father to support the illegitimate child does not qualify such child or his issue to inherit from the
father in the absence of an order of filiation made as prescribed by subparagraph (2). (4) A motion for relief from an order of filiation may be
made only by the father, and such motion must be made within one year
from the entry of such order. (b) If an illegitimate child dies, his surviving
spouse, issue, mother, maternal kindred and father inherit and are entitled
to letters of administration as if the decedent were legitimate, provided
that the father may inherit or obtain such letters only if an order of filiation has been made in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph (2).
Id. at 261 n.2 (quoting N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 4-1.2 (McKinney 1967)).
187. Id. at 266.
188. Id. at 273 (emphasis added).
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be judicially determined before the father's death.189 The Court concluded
that this requirement did "bear an evident and substantial relation"' 90 to the
state interest in providing "for the just and orderly disposition of property at
death."' 9' As the Court noted, proof of paternity, when the non-marital father
might well not be a part of the child's family, is subject to more uncertainties
than is proof of maternity' 92 and the state's interest in an orderly and accurate
procedure for distributing the assets of decedents is furthered by the requirement that paternity be determined during the father's lifetime, when the father
is available to provide evidence and challenge untrue allegations of paternity. 193 The New York statute, then, did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause because "the requirement imposed by [the New York statute] on illegitimate children who would inherit from their fathers is substantially related
to the important state interests the statute is intended to promote"', 94 in contrast to the Illinois statute, which "was far in excess of its justifiable purposes."' 9 5 The constitutionally significant distinction between the Illinois
statute that was struck down in Trimble and the New York statute that was
upheld in Lalli quite clearly seems to be that the Illinois statute imposed an
absolute, blanket bar on inheritance by illegitimate children while the New
York statute was more narrowly tailored.
Both Trimble and Lalli, then, confirm that statutes that limit inheritance
rights on the basis of classifications based on illegitimacy must be "substantially related to the important state interests the statute is intended to promote"' 96 and that the "just and orderly disposition of property at death"' 197 is
an important state interest. While the Lalli decision does not clearly establish
the extent to which proof of paternity requirements may be imposed on illegitimate children without overstepping the restraints of the Equal Protection
Clause, it is consistent with the clear message of Trimble that statutes that
impose blanket disinheritance on illegitimates (i.e., statutes that provide no
mechanism to allow illegitimates to establish their claim of inheritance rights)
are constitutionally infirm.
Trimble and Lalli were the last Supreme Court decisions to deal directly
with the inheritance rights of non-marital children.' 98 They were followed,
189. Id. at 267.
190. Id. at 268.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 268-69.
193. Id. at 271-72.
194. Id. at 275-76.
195. Id. at 273.
196. Id. at 275-76.
197. Id. at 268.
198. With one exception-the Court held in 1986, in Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S.
852 (1986), that Trimble applied retroactively and, therefore, a Texas statute that
"prohibited an illegitimate child from inheriting from [the child's] father unless [the
child's] parents had subsequently married," id. at 853, was invalidly applied to the
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however, by a series of three cases that addressed the constitutionality of state
statutes that imposed time limitations on the ability of illegitimate children to
bring paternity actions as a prerequisite to seeking support from their fathers.
In Mills v. Habluetzel,'99 the Court struck down a Texas statute that required
that suits by illegitimate children to establish paternity be brought before the
child reached one year of age. The Court recognized the state's interest in
avoiding stale or fraudulent claims, but concluded that allowing only one year
in which to bring paternity claims did not provide illegitimate children "an
adequate opportunity to obtain support." 200 Shortly thereafter, in Pickett v.
Brown, 20 1 the Court stuck down a Tennessee statute that imposed a two-year
statute of limitations on paternity claims brought by some illegitimate children. Again, the Court concluded that the allowable time period did not "provide illegitimate children with 'an adequate opportunity to obtain support,"' 20 2 but rather "amounts to a restriction effectively extinguishing the
support rights of illegitimate children that cannot be justified by the problems
of proof surrounding paternity actions." 20 3 Finally, in Clark v. Jeter,20 4 the
Court struck down a Pennsylvania statute that required that illegitimate children bring paternity suits within six years of the child's birth. While again
questioning whether the allowable time period was sufficient to provide a
reasonable opportunity for the child to assert a claim, the Court rested its
decision on the absence of a substantial relationship between the six year
period and the state's interest in avoiding stale or fraudulent claims. 20 5 The
number of circumstances in the Pennsylvania scheme that did allow paternity
a°6
to be litigated more than six years after the birth of an illegitimate child
belied the state's claim that the six year period was substantially related to the
prevention of fraudulent or stale claims. 207 In Clark, the Court for the first
time explicitly acknowledged that classifications based on illegitimacy are
inheritance rights of a child whose father had died before Trimble was decided, id. at
856.
199. 456 U.S. 91 (1982).
200. Id. at 99-100.
201. 462 U.S. 1 (1983).
202. Id. at 13 (quoting Mills, 456 U.S. at 100).
203. Id.
204. 486 U.S. 456 (1988).
205. Id. at 463-64.
206. Id. at 464 ("In a number of circumstances, Pennsylvania permits the issue of
paternity to be litigated more than six years after the birth of an illegitimate child. The
statute itself permits a suit to be brought more than six years after the child's birth if it
is brought within two years of a support payment made by the father. And in other
types of suits, Pennsylvania places no limits on when the issue of paternity may be
litigated. For example, the intestacy statute permits a child born out of wedlock to
establish paternity as long as 'there is clear and convincing evidence that the man was
the father of the child.' Likewise, no statute of limitations applies to a father's action
to establish paternity.") (citation omitted).
207. Id.
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subject to intermediate scrutiny, requiring that the statutory classification "be
208
substantially related to an important governmental objective.,,
Three themes emerge from the illegitimacy cases. First, it is now clear
that classifications based on illegitimacy subjected to equal protection chal2° 9
lenges will be given intermediate scrutiny. It is clear as well that this in210°
as equal protection chaltermediate scrutiny is indeed "'not... toothless,,
in the Supreme
succeeded
have
lenges to illegitimacy-based classifications
21
Court in the great majority of cases. Second, the Court's suspicion of classifications based on illegitimacy and its decision to apply heightened scrutiny
to them is rooted to a substantial degree in the notion, clearly articulated in
Weber and frequently repeated thereafter, that it is both unfair and illogical to
impose burdens on children because of the misconduct of their parents. And
third, statutes that impose blanket disadvantages on illegitimate children,
without providing some reasonable mechanism to avoid those disadvantages,
almost certainly do not bear the substantial relationship to an important governmental interest test required under intermediate scrutiny.
B. The Constitutionalityof DisinheritingChildren
in Termination of ParentalRights Proceedings
Are Type 2 termination of parental rights statutes (and Type 3 statutes
that are interpreted to bar inheritance by children of terminated parents) subject to equal protection challenges in the same way as statutes (like the statute
struck down in Trimble) that excessively restrict the inheritance rights of
children from their non-marital fathers? We must ask first whether these statutes discriminate in the sense that they disadvantage one group of children
(children whose parents have been terminated but who have not been subsequently adopted) over other children (children whose parents have not been
terminated or children who have been adopted). It would appear so. Children
whose parents have not been terminated may inherit from and through their
parents, subject only to reasonable limitations that may be imposed on their
212
right to inherit from non-marital fathers. Adopted children can inherit from
their adoptive parents, and usually they can inherit from their adoptive parents kin as well. 21 3 In some instances, adopted children may also be able to
inherit from their natural parents and their kin. 21 4 In contrast, in jurisdictions
with Type 2 statutes, or with Type 3 statutes that are interpreted to cut off all
208. Id. at 461.
209. See id.; see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 137, at 807.
210. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977) (quoting Mathews v. Lucas,
427 U.S. 495, 510 1976)).
211. See cases discussed supra this Section.
212. See supra text accompanying note 132.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
214. See supra text accompanying note 93.
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rights (including inheritance) of both parent and child, children cannot inherit
from their terminated parent or parents and likely cannot inherit from their
natural parents' kin either. Like the Illinois statute struck down in Trimble,
these TPR statutes impose a "total statutory disinheritance" on the affected
children. These statutes, then, discriminate against children of terminated
parents in a very significant way.
But most statutes, of course, discriminate in the sense that they classify
people and treat them differently because of that classification. Whether a
classification violates the Equal Protection Clause depends in large part on
the level of judicial scrutiny to which it is subjected. 215 What level of scrutiny, then, should be applied to TPR statutes that disinherit children? As the
classification created by the TPR statues is not based on race and does not
impact fundamental rights, it would not be subjected to strict scrutiny. Intermediate scrutiny, which requires that "a statutory classification must be substantially related to an important governmental objective," 216 has been applied primarily to classifications based on gender 2 7 or, as we have seen, on
illegitimacy. 218 Should TPR statutes that disinherit children be subjected to
the intermediate scrutiny applied in the illegitimacy cases, such as Trimble?
To answer those questions, we must consider the rationale for applying in215. As Professors Nowak and Rotunda put it in their treatise on constitutional
law: "the ultimate conclusion as to whether a classification meets the equal protection
guarantee in large measure depends upon the degree of independent review exercised
by the judiciary over the legislative line-drawing in the establishment of the classification." NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 137, at 638. As Justice Scalia somewhat
more pointedly characterized the matter in his dissenting opinion in United States v.
Virginia,
our current equal protection jurisprudence, which regards this Court as
free to evaluate everything under the sun by applying one of three tests:
'rational basis' scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny. These
tests are no more scientific than their names suggest, and a further element
of randomness is added by the fact that it is largely up to us which test
will be applied in each case.
518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
216. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). Again, Justice Scalia describes the
intermediate scrutiny test somewhat more caustically in his United States v. Virginia
dissent: "We have no established criterion for 'intermediate scrutiny' either, but essentially apply it when it seems like a good idea to load the dice." Virginia, 518 U.S.
at 568 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217. Some commentators have suggested that the Court has in fact applied an
enhanced intermediate scrutiny standard of review to gender discrimination cases,
noting the requirement expressed in Justice Ginsburg's opinion in United States v.
Virginia, that the state demonstrate an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for its
gender discrmination at the Virginia Military Institute. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534. See
R. Randall Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and Related Constitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights: The "Base Plus Six"
Model and Modern Supreme Court Practice,4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225 (2002).
218. See Clark,486 U.S. 456.
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termediate scrutiny in illegitimacy cases and determine whether those rationales apply to termination of parental rights cases.
Why does illegitimacy warrant intermediate scrutiny? The Court has not
provided a satisfying answer to that question. After twenty years of deciding
equal protection challenges to classifications based on illegitimacy, the Court
for the first time explicitly acknowledged that intermediate scrutiny applied to
2 19
statutes that discriminate on the basis of illegitimacy in 1988 in Clark. The
Clark decision did not explain why intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate
standard of review, but rather simply cited Mills and Mathews as examples of
220
prior cases in which intermediate scrutiny had been applied to illegitimacy
(although, as noted above, the term "intermediate scrutiny" was not used in
either case). Neither Mathews nor Mills, however, provides much additional
insight into the rationale for applying intermediate scrutiny to illegitimacy.
In Mathews, the Court explicitly discussed the appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied to illegitimacy classifications. 22' That discussion, however,
consisted primarily of an explanation of what level of scrutiny the Court was
not applying--strict scrutiny-rather than a clear articulation of what level of
scrutiny it was applying. The Court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that classifications based on illegitimacy required "the judicial scrutiny
traditionally devoted to cases involving discrimination along lines of race or
national origin., 222 The Court acknowledged that "the legal status of illegitimacy, however defined, is, like race or national origin, a characteristic determined by causes not within the control of the illegitimate individual, and it
bears no relation to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute to
society. '' 223 However, while illegitimacy has historically imposed burdens on
illegitimate children, discrimination against illegitimate children "has never
approached the severity or pervasiveness of the historic legal and political
discrimination against women and Negroes." 224 The Court suggested that the
distinction between race-based discrimination and discrimination based on

219. Id. at 461 ("In considering whether state legislation violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, we apply different levels of scrutiny to
different types of classifications. At a minimum, a statutory classification must be
rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Classifications based on race
or national origin, and classifications affecting fundamental rights, are given the most
exacting scrutiny. Between these extremes of rational basis review and strict scrutiny
lies a level of intermediate scrutiny, which generally has been applied to discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy.") (citations omitted). Some commentators have argued that, in fact, the Court applies more than the traditionally enumerated three standards of review. See Kelso, supra note 217.
220. Clark,486 U.S. at 461.
221. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504-06 (1976).
222. Id. at 504 (footnotes omitted).
223. Id. at 505.
224. Id. at 506.
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illegitimacy may, in part, rest on the
fact that "illegitimacy does not carry an
225
obvious badge, as race or sex do.,
The Clark Court's citation of Mathews in support of its announcement
that intermediate scrutiny was applicable to classifications based on illegitimacy seems a bit puzzling. The Clark opinion explicitly noted that intermediate scrutiny "applied to discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy, '22 6 a conclusion which was followed by citations to both illegitimacy cases and gender discrimination cases , 227 suggesting the equivalence of
these classifications. In the Mathews decision itself, however, the Court had
drawn significant distinctions between classifications based on illegitimacy
and those based on sex, emphasizing that illegitimates do not carry an obvious badge and that historic discrimination against illegitimates has not been
228
of the same magnitude as discrimination against women.
The Mills decision provides even less guidance. Again, the Court never
explicitly identifies the level of scrutiny it is applying, noting only that
"[s]uch restrictions will survive equal protection scrutiny to the extent they
are substantially related to a legitimate state interest," citing Lalli, Trimble,
and Mathews.229
While the Court, then, has made clear that classifications based on illegitimacy warrant intermediate scrutiny, it has not made clear why intermediate scrutiny is appropriate. In the absence of more explicit guidance from the
Court, what rationales can we infer from the illegitimacy cases to explain the
application of intermediate scrutiny to classifications based on illegitimacy?
In other contexts, such as race and gender, the Court has focused on the immutability of the characteristic as a rationale for heightened scrutiny. 230 The
Court suggests something like that in Mathews, when it notes that "the legal
status of illegitimacy, however defined, is, like race or national origin, a characteristic determined by causes not within the control of the illegitimate individual.",231 As the Court also noted in Mathews, however, illegitimate children do not bear an obvious badge reflecting their status, as racial minorities,
225. Id.
226. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456,461 (1988).
227. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (holding that the
state's policy of excluding males from a state supported school of nursing was unconstitutional); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982) (invalidating a Texas statute that
required that suits by illegitimate children to establish paternity be brought before the
child reached one year of age); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating an
Oklahoma statute that differentiated on the base of gender the age at which 3.2 percent beer could be legally purchased); Mathews, 427 U.S. 495 (upholding provisions
of the Social Security Act that restricted eligibility of certain illegitimate children for
surviving child's insurance benefits).
228. Mathews, 427 U.S. at 506.
229. Mills, 456 U.S. at 99.
230. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
231. Mathews, 427 U.S. at 505.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss1/8
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or, for that matter, women, do. 232 Unlike race or gender, illegitimacy is not a
physical characteristic, but a purely legal one.
A history of discrimination has also supported heightened scrutiny in
other contexts, again most notably gender.233 The existence of a history of
discrimination has also received sporadic note by the Court as a basis for its
special concern with illegitimate children.234 As the Court noted in Mathews,
however, the historical discrimination against illegitimates, while very real,
235
has been limited in scope (primarily related to inheritance rights, governmental benefits, 2 36 and the right to parental support237), in contrast to the per-

vasive, systemic discrimination faced by women (or, for that matter, by racial
minorities).
Immutability and historical discrimination, then, seem at most to be secondary rationales for the application of intermediate scrutiny to classifications
based on illegitimacy. Something more fundamental must underlie the Courts
designation of illegitimacy as a classification that warrants intermediate scrutiny. What is it? The single most prevalent theme that recurs throughout the
illegitimacy cases is the Court's suspicion of classifications that impose disadvantages on illegitimate children because of the misconduct of their parents. That concern, as we have seen, was clearly expressed early on in Weber.
The language used by the Weber Court bears quoting at length, as it clearly
and forcefully articulates the Court's concern with classifications that punish
children for the actions of their parents:
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society's
condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. But visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal
burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility
or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and
penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual-as well as an unjust-way of deterring the parent. Courts are powerless to prevent
232. Id. at 506.
233. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996); Frontiero,411 U.S.
at 684.
234. See Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 8 (1983) ("In view of the history of treating illegitimate children less favorably than legitimate ones, we have subjected statutory classifications based on illegitimacy to a heightened level of scrutiny.").
235. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762
(1977).

236. See Mathews, 427 U.S. 495; Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974);
N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
237. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988); Pickett, 462 U.S. 1; Mills v.
Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
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the social opprobrium suffered by these hapless children, but the
Equal Protection Clause does enable us to strike down discriminatory laws relating to status of birth where-as in this case-the
classification is justified by no legitimate state interest, compelling
or otherwise. 238
This passage has been quoted repeatedly in subsequent illegitimacy
cases. The passage, in whole or in part, is found in New Jersey Welfare Rights
24
242
24
239
Mills,243 Pickett,
Jimenez,24 ° Mathews, ' Trimble,
Organization,
2 46
Reed, 41and Clark. The Court acknowledged the central role of this concern

with punishment of children for the wrongs of their parents in Reed, noting
the "rather clear distinction that has emerged from our cases considering the
constitutionality of statutory provisions that impose special burdens on illegitimate children. In these cases, we have unambiguously concluded that a
State may not justify discriminatory treatment of illegitimates in order to express its disapproval of their parents' misconduct., 247 This concern, first articulated in Weber and relied upon in later illegitimacy cases, more than any
other possible factor (such as a history of discrimination or immutability)
seems to capture the essence of the Court's special concern for illegitimate
children.248

238. Weber, 406 U.S. at 175-76 (footnotes omitted).
239. 411 U.S. at 620.
240. 417 U.S. at 632.
241. 427 U.S. at 505.
242. 430 U.S. 762, 769-70 (1977).
243. 456 U.S. 91, 101 n.8 (1982).
244. 462 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1983).
245. 476 U.S. 852, 855 n.5 (1986).
246. 486 U.S. 456,461 (1988).
247. Reed, 476 U.S. at 854.
248. The Court's special concern for children who suffer governmentally imposed
burdens because of the misdeeds of their parents is not limited to illegitimate children.
In Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), the Court struck down as violating the Equal
Protection Clause a Texas law that denied free public education to undocumented
children. The Court noted that:
Persuasive arguments support the view that a State may withhold its beneficence from those whose very presence within the United States is the
product of their own unlawful conduct. These arguments do not apply
with the same force to classifications imposing disabilities on the minor
children of such illegal entrants. At the least, those who elect to enter our
territory by stealth and in violation of our law should be prepared to bear
the consequences, including, but not limited to, deportation. But the children of those illegal entrants are not comparably situated. Their "parents
have the ability to conform their conduct to societal norms," and presumably the ability to remove themselves from the State's jurisdiction; but
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss1/8
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The question, then, is whether TPR statutes that bar inheritance by children from their biological parents should be subject to the same scrutiny as
statutes, such as the Illinois statute struck down in Trimble, that bar inheritance by illegitimate children from their biological fathers. The plight of children who have lost the right to inherit from their parents or their parents'
relatives solely as a result of their status as children of parents whose parental
rights have been terminated seems strikingly similar to the status of illegitimate children prior to Trimble and seems therefore to warrant the same "special concern" of the Court and the heightened scrutiny that comes with that
concern. Like illegitimate children, children of terminated parents are burdened by a classification caused by the wrongdoing or inadequacy of their
parents, for which they have no responsibility. Like illegitimate children,
children of terminated parents are in fact victims of their parents' behavior.
Just as it is "illogical and unjust" (to use the words of Weber) to inflict governmental disabilities on illegitimate children who have already been disadvantaged by their parent's behavior, so it seems equally inappropriate for the
state to add to the burdens of children of terminated parents-children who
bear no responsibility for their status but are clearly disadvantaged, if not by
the status itself, then by the circumstances that led to the status-in the absence of a substantial governmental interest.
If statutes that extinguish the inheritance rights of children of terminated
parents were subjected to intermediate scrutiny, in the same way as statutes
that discriminate against illegitimate children are, how would they fare? Governmental classifications that burden illegitimate children will survive equal
protection challenges only if the statutory classification is "substantially re249
The Court clearly acknowllated to an important governmental objective.,
edged in both Trimble and Lalli that the states have a significant interest in
"safeguarding the accurate and orderly disposition of property at death."25
The Illinois statute that barred illegitimate children from inheriting from their
fathers was struck down by the Trimble Court because it was not substantially
related to an important governmental objective. As the Lalli decision demonstrates, however, more narrowly tailored statutes that disinherit illegitimate
the children who are plaintiffs in these cases "can affect neither their parents' conduct nor their own status."
Id. at 219-20 (emphasis added) (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770
(1977)). The Court also noted that the challenged Texas law "is directed against children, and imposes its discriminatory burden on the basis of a legal characteristic over
which children can have little control," id. at 220, and that the law "imposes a lifetime
hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling status," id.
at 223. Although the Court did not explicitly announce the level of scrutiny it was
applying, commentators have concluded that the Court in fact applied intermediate
scrutiny. See

ERWIN

CHEMERINSKY,

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW:

PRINCIPLES

AND

POLICIEs, 747 (2d ed. 2002).
249. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
250. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 274 n.1 1(1978).
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children can meet that test if they are substantially related to the government's interest in the orderly disposition of a decedent's property. The New
York statute challenged in Lalli survived intermediate scrutiny because its
requirement that paternity be established during the lifetime of the father enhanced the accuracy of the property disposition process "by placing paternity
disputes in a judicial forum during the lifetime of the father,, 25 1 where his
"'availability ...should be a substantial factor contributing to the reliability
25 2
of the fact-finding process.'
Statutes that bar inheritance by children of terminated parents, however,
are not "substantially related" to the state's interest in accurate, just, and orderly distribution of property in the same manner as the paternity proof requirements upheld in Lalli. The restrictions upheld in Lalli went to the need
to determine paternity in a fair, timely, and accurate manner. While we may
disagree about the strictness of any particular proof of paternity requirement,
the underlying rationale for the existence of such requirements is clear and
reasonable. Inheritance rights of a child are based on the parent-child relationship.25 3 In the absence of certainty concerning the existence of a fatherchild relationship, it is difficult to make property dispositions that are based
on that relationship in an accurate, fair, and timely manner.
Termination of parental rights statutes that extinguish the right of the
child to inherit, however, are quite different from the proof of paternity requirements upheld in Lalli. The paternity requirements upheld in Lalli were
designed to address the uncertainty of parental identity that frequently accompanies non-marital children. In contrast, there usually is no uncertainty as
to the identity of the natural parents in TPR cases. In most termination cases,
we know who the parents are, and we know that (at least at the commencement of the TPR proceeding) a parent-child relationship exists. The requirements upheld in the illegitimacy cases, then, are aimed at establishing certainty in the face of actual or presumed uncertainty about paternity-certainty
that is necessary for the accurate and fair disposition of assets in an inheritance regime which bases inheritance rights primarily the existence of a parent-child relationship. The TPR statutes do not fulfill a similar function, as
they disqualify children when there is no uncertainty as to their parentage.
But, as discussed above, 254 the state might argue that extinguishing the
child's right to inherit from a terminated parent serves the state's broader
interest in an accurate, just, and orderly distribution of decedents' property in
another way-by eliminating as possible heirs children who, because their
ties to the parent were severed, are more likely to be unknown to, or unlocatable by, the estate administrator. But would an assertion of that interest be

251. Id.at 271.
252. Id.(quoting Inre Estate of Lalli, 340 N.E.2d 721, 724 (N.Y. 1975), vacated
by 431 U.S. 911 (1977)).
253. See supra text accompanying notes 80-87.
254. See supra text accompanying note 130.
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sufficient to sustain a classification subject to intermediate scrutiny? The
Court in Trimble acknowledged the importance of the state interest in the
disposition of property at death and recognized that difficulties "of proving
paternity might justify a more demanding standard for illegitimate children
claiming under their fathers' estates than that required either for illegitimate
children claiming under their mothers' estates or for legitimate children generally., 255 Termination of parental rights statutes that disinherit the child,
however, seem possessed of the very characteristic that proved fatal to the
Illinois statute in Trimble-they impose a blanket prohibition on inheritance.
The Illinois statute failed because "[d]ifficulties of proving paternity in some
situations do not justify the total statutory disinheritance of illegitimate children" inflicted by the statute.2 56 Termination of parental rights statutes effect
an automatic disinheritance of all children of terminated parents very much
257
that the Court found constituakin to the "total statutory disinheritance"
statutes that disinherit the
Termination
tionally objectionable in Trimble.
proof requirement uppaternity
the
Unlike
child do so in a blanket manner.
by which the
mechanism
no
provide
statutes
held in Lalli, the termination
As we have
parent.
terminated
the
from
inherit
to
child can establish a right
illegitimate
on
disabilities
blanket
or
absolute
seen, statutes that imposed
child to
the
for
opportunity
reasonable
no
children (i.e., statutes that provide
consistently
have
illegitimate)
as
status
her
avoid the burdens imposed by
258
If the Court similarly applies intermediate scrutiny to
been stuck down.
termination of parental rights statutes that impose blanket disinheritance on
children, those statutes may be struck down as well.
If TPR statutes are subject to intermediate scrutiny, then, provisions that
disinherit the children of terminated parents may well be vulnerable to equal
protection challenges. Given the uncertainties inherent in equal protection
jurisprudence, however, it is very hard to predict whether children of terminated parents will be recognized as a class warranting intermediate level scrutiny. The Court has been notably sparing in its selection of classifications
subject to intermediate scrutiny--explicitly designating only gender and illegitimacy-and the Court has not demonstrated any eagerness to enlarge the
259
If the status of children whose parents' rights
list of quasi-suspect classes.
have been terminated is not sufficiently analogous to illegitimacy to trigger
intermediate scrutiny, statutes that disinherit these children would be subject
to the lowest level of scrutiny, "rational basis." How would termination of

255. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S.762, 770 (1977).
256. Id. at 772.
257. Id.
258. See Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91
(1982); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S.
628 (1974); N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Gomez v. Perez,
409 U.S. 535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
259. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 248, at 645-46.
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parental rights statutes that disinherit children fare under this lower level of
scrutiny?
If TPR statutes are subject to traditional rational basis scrutiny, requiring
only a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest, they are likely to
survive constitutional challenge. It is notoriously difficult to mount a successful challenge to a statutory classification that is subject to traditional rational
basis scrutiny. 260 The standard is extraordinarily forgiving. 261 The existence
of any plausible relationship between the classification and any conceivable
justification, however hypothetical, will suffice. 262 In a challenge to TPR
statutes, the disinheritance of children who may be more likely than other
children to be unknown to or unlocatable by estate administrators wouldseem
to be rationally related to the state's interest in the efficient administration of
decedents' estates. That the classification is over-inclusive (because many
children of terminated parents are known to and can be located by the estate
administrator) or under-inclusive (because other categories of heirs may be
unknown or difficult to locate) is unlikely to invalidate the governmental
action. In traditional rational basis review, it does not matter that the challenged classification is far broader or narrower than necessary to achieve the
government's purpose. Over-inclusiveness or under-inclusiveness is not fatal
263
in the world of traditional rational basis review.
However, rational basis scrutiny has sometimes appeared in a more rigorous variant. Perhaps the most prominent recent example in which a statutory classification subject to rational basis scrutiny was struck down is City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.264 While the Court said it was applying
260. Id.

261. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 324 (1993) ("A statutory classification fails
rational-basis review only when it 'rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective."') (citations omitted). See also CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 248, at 652.
262. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 248, at 657; Robert C. Farrell, Successful
Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Courtfrom the 1971 Term Through Romer v.

Evans, 32 IND. L. REv. 357, 359 (1999).
263. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 248, at 659-60.
264. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). In Cleburne, a land use case, the City of Cleburne zoning ordinance required special use permits to locate "hospitals for the insane or feeble-minded" in the city's R-3 (Apartment House) district. Id. at 436 & n.3. The city
denied a special use permit for a group home for the mentally retarded, which the city
classified as a hospital for the feebleminded. Id. at 436-37. The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit had subjected the ordinance to intermediate scrutiny because it
viewed mental retardation as a quasi-suspect classification and had struck the ordinance down as violating the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 438. The United States
Supreme Court disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's characterization of mental retardation as a quasi-suspect classification. Id. at 442. The Court, therefore, required only
that the challenged classification be "rationally related to a legitimate governmental
purpose." Id. at 446. But, while nominally applying this low level rational basis test,
the Court struck down the zoning ordinance requirement that homes for the mentally
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss1/8
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rational basis scrutiny, it in fact scrutinized the government's justifications
with a degree of rigor that is quite atypical of rational basis cases, seemingly
discounting the strong presumption of constitutionality typically afforded
legislative actions subject to rational basis scrutiny and requiring a better
articulated justification than typically required.265 Commentators have noted
similarly appeared to apply rational basis scruother cases in which the26Court
6
rigor.
atypical
tiny with
As the Court has not explicitly acknowledged the existence of heightened rational basis scrutiny, it is difficult to articulate the test with precision.
When applying heightened rational basis scrutiny, the Court appears to inquire more seriously into the governmental purpose and to require "some real
correlation between classification and purpose." 267 The Court is more inclined
to require evidence on the record of the governmental purpose and is less
likely to be satisfied with hypothetical rationales. 268 As is evidenced by Cleburne, the Court is likely to be troubled by significant over-inclusiveness or
under-inclusiveness when applying heightened rational basis scrutiny, in clear
269
contrast to its traditional rational basis approach.
retarded obtain a special use permit because it found no rational basis for believing
that the proposed group home for the mentally retarded would harm the city's legitimate interests differently from any of the uses, such as "apartment houses, multiple
dwellings, boarding and lodging houses, fraternity or sorority houses, dormitories,
apartment hotels, hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes for convalescents or the aged
(other than for the insane or feebleminded or alcoholics or drug addicts), private clubs
or fraternal orders." Id. at 447-50. Justice Marshall, in his separate opinion, opined
that "I cannot accept the Court's disclaimer that no 'more exacting standard' than
ordinary rational-basis review is being applied," and noted that the city's "ordinance
surely would be valid under the traditional rational-basis test applicable to economic
and commercial regulation," and that the Court had in fact subjected the ordinance to
"heightened scrutiny." Id. at 456 (Marshall, J., concurring in part & dissenting in
part). Subsequent commentators have generally agreed that the Cleburne Court applied something more rigorous than traditional rational basis review. Richard B.
Saphire, Equal Protection, Rational Basis Review, and the Impact of Cleburne Living
Center, Inc., 88 KY. L.J. 591, 615 (1999-2000).
265. Saphire, supra note 264, at 612-13.
266. Farrell, supra note 262 (listing as cases applying rational basis scrutiny in
equal protection cases in a manner that seemed to reflect heightened scrutiny, in addition to Cleburne: Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S.
95 (1989); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm 'n, 488 U.S. 336 (1989);
Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985); Williams v. Vermont,
472 U.S. 14 (1985); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985); Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); United States
Dep't ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)).

267. Farrell, supra note 262, at 360.
268. Id.
269. The government had denied the plaintiff's special use permit for a group
home for the mentally retarded in part because the home would be located in a flood
plain. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449. The Court discounted the city's concern about flood
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Would TPR statutes that disinherit children survive heightened rational
basis scrutiny? The efficient administration of decedents' estates is quite
clearly a justifiable-indeed even substantial-governmental goal.2 70 It
would be more difficult, however, for the government to establish that there is
a real correlation between the disinheritance of all children of terminated
parents and the governmental interest in efficient estate administration. While
there is surely some relationship--heirs are likely to be more readily identified and located within intact families-the automatic disinheritance of all
children of terminated parents is seriously over-inclusive. While some children of terminated parents may be difficult to locate, or even be unknown by
estate administrators, many such children would be easily identified and located. Termination of parental rights effectively severs the legal relationship
between the terminated parent and the child, but it can hardly be imagined
that it extinguishes the emotional bond between the terminated parent. (and
the terminated parent's family) and the child. Families are unlikely to forget
the existence of a grandchild or sibling simply because the parental rights of
the child's parent were judicially terminated. It is from these families that the
administrators of the decedent parent's estate are likely to be drawn. Statutes
that disinherit children of terminated parents are not only over-inclusive, they
are also under-inclusive. While some children of terminated parents may be
difficult to locate during estate administration, so may other estranged relatives who are not subject to automatic disinheritance. If this Cleburne variant
of rational basis scrutiny were applied to statutes that impose a blanket disinheritance of children of terminated parents, then, it would be difficult for the
state to affirmatively establish the necessary relationship to an appropriate
governmental purpose.
But would the Court apply heightened rational basis scrutiny to statutes
that disinherit children of terminated parents? Again because the Court has
not explicitly acknowledged that heightened rational basis scrutiny even exists, it has not made clear when such scrutiny might apply. Some have suggested that there simply is no pattern to be discerned. As one commentator
has put it: "[The] search for an underlying principle that would explain the
results in the heightened rationality cases appears to be unsuccessful. Rather,
it appears that the Court, without explanation, decided in a particular case to

safety because other similar facilities, such as nursing homes, sanitariums, and homes
for the aged could be located in the flood plain without a special use permit. Id. Similarly, the Court discounted the city's reliance on concerns about the number of persons allowed to inhabit the group home by noting that, under the city's zoning ordinance, the same densities would be allowable for similar facilities, such as boarding
houses, nursing homes, and fraternity houses. Id. at 449-50. These are the kinds of
under-inclusiveness that would not typically raise concern under traditional rational
basis scrutiny.
270. See Lalli v Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762
(1977).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss1/8
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27
use heightened rationality and thus the claim succeeded." ' One aspect of the
TPR statutes suggest that they might attract the Court's special attention. As
discussed above, in the illegitimacy cases (and others) the Court has seemed
to evince a particular sympathy for children who are subjected to disadvan272
tage because of the misconduct of their parents. That sympathy appeared to
underlie the Court's designation of illegitimate children as a class worthy of
intermediate scrutiny. Even if the Court declines to extend intermediate scrutiny to children of terminated parents, that same concern might at least instigate the application of heightened rational basis scrutiny.

V. CONCLUSION
In a number of states, termination of parental rights statutes (Type 2
statutes) explicitly provide that a termination order extinguishes the inheritance rights of the child. In an even greater number of states, the termination
of parental rights statutes (Type 3 statutes), while not explicitly addressing
inheritance rights, employ language that might well be interpreted to terminate not just the rights of the parent, but the rights of the child arising from
the parent-child relationship as well. In some of these jurisdictions, the courts
have directly held (or indirectly suggested) that such statutes also extinguish
the inheritance rights of the child. In many states, then, children who have
been rendered legal orphans because of the termination of parental rights of
their parents risk losing not only their relationship with their biological parents, but their right to inherit from them as well.
Extinguishing the inheritance rights of children of terminated parents is
unwarranted. While extinguishing the inheritance rights of the child may, to a
very modest extent, enhance the efficiency of estate administration by foreclosing the possibility that children, as heirs, may be unknown or unlocatable
when the estate of the parent is administered, it seems a substantial overreaction to mandate a blanket disinheritance of all children of terminated parents.
Other, far less draconian mechanisms are available to address the problem of
unknown or unlocatable heirs. Termination of parental rights statutes, the
very purpose of which is to protect children, seem to operate quite perversely
when they disinherit the very objects of their protection. Termination of parental rights statutes that disinherit children may be not only misconceived,
they may be unconstitutional as well.
States with Type 2 statutes should amend their termination of parental
rights statutes to explicitly provide that the right of the child to inherit from
the parent survives termination, as Type 1 statutes do. The ideal termination
of parental rights statute would make clear not only that the child's right to
inherit from her biological parents continues until adoption, but that the
child's right to inherit through the biological parents from the biological par271. Farrell, supra note 262, at 415.
272. See supra text accompanying notes 238-48.
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ents' relatives is also preserved. A provision reading as follows would suffice: "A termination of parental rights shall not terminate the right of the child
to inherit from or through the parent. The right of27inheritance
of the child
3
shall be terminated only by a final order of adoption,
States with Type 3 statutes should similarly amend their termination
statutes. In the absence of legislative action, courts should interpret the effect
of a termination order as narrowly as the statutory language allows in order to
preserve the child's inheritance rights. Courts can follow the leads of the
Rhode Island Supreme Court in State v. Fritz274 and the West Virginia Supreme Court in In re Stephen Tyler R.275 that have read termination statutes
narrowly so as to preserve the child's right to support from the terminated
parent. The termination of parental rights process is intended, above all, to
protect children. That underlying goal should inform courts' interpretation of
the effect of a termination order.

273. The language in my suggested statute is borrowed in part from Kansas Statute Annotated Section 38-1583(f) (2001) and District of Columbia Code Annotated
Section 16-2361 (a) (200 1).
274. 801 A.2d 679 (R.I. 2002). See supra note 69.
275. 584 S.E.2d 581 (W. Va. 2003). See supra note 69.
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